netdev - Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices

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Message-ID: <20121207122516.GA16577@redhat.com>
Date:	Fri, 7 Dec 2012 14:25:16 +0200
From:	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:	Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, jasowang@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap
 devices

On Thu, Dec 06, 2012 at 04:09:51PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thursday, December 06, 2012 10:57:16 PM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 06, 2012 at 11:56:45AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > The SETQUEUE/tun_socket:create_queue permissions do not yet exist in any
> > > released SELinux policy as we are just now adding them with this patchset.
> > > With current policies loaded into a kernel with this patchset applied the
> > > SETQUEUE/tun_socket:create_queue permission would be treated according to
> > > the policy's unknown permission setting.
> > 
> > OK I think we need to rethink what we are doing here: what you sent
> > addresses the problem as stated but I think we mis-stated it.  Let me
> > try to restate the problem: it is not just selinux problem. Let's assume
> > qemu wants to use tun, I (libvirt) don't want to run it as root.
> > 
> > 1. TUNSETIFF: I can open tun, attach an fd and pass it to qemu.
> > Now, qemu does not invoke TUNSETIFF so it can run without
> > kernel priveledges.
> 
> Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe libvirt does this while running as 
> root.  Assuming that is the case, why not simply setuid()/setgid() to the same 
> credentials as the QEMU instance before creating the TUN device?  You can 
> always (re)configure the device afterwards while running as 
> root/CAP_NET_ADMIN.

We want isolation between qemu instances.
Giving qemu right to open tun and SETIFF would give it rights
to access any tun device.

There could also be user tun users we want them isolated from qemu.

> > 2. TUNSETQUEUE - I can open tun and attach a queue but this
> > is not what is needed since this automatically switches
> > to multiqueue mode - we want to change number of queues
> > on the fly.
> > So qemu needs to be allowed to run TUNSETQUEUE.
> > Since this checks tun_not_capable(tun) we would need
> > to give qemu these priveledges, and we want to avoid this
> > (I can go into why if it's not obvious).
> 
> If libvirt creates the TUN device while its effective credentials match those 
> of the QEMU instance then the QEMU instance should be able to perform a 
> TUNSETQUEUE, yes?
> 
> > How can we slove this?
> > I don't see a way without extending the interface.
> > Here's a simple way to extend it: pass a flag to TUNSETQUEUE
> > that enables/disables TX on this queue.
> > If TX is disabled, ignore this queue for flow steering decisions.
> > Allow TUNSETQUEUE for a non priveledged user if it
> > it already bound to the currect tun and only changes this flag.
> > 
> > Now I open tun and SETQUEUE with TX disabled flag. Pass it to qemu.
> > qemu calls SETQUEUE with TX enabled flag.
> > 
> > Jason? Want to try implementing and see what people think?
> 
> -- 
> paul moore
> security and virtualization @ redhat
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