Message-ID: <20121210172656.GA30775@redhat.com>
Date:	Mon, 10 Dec 2012 19:26:56 +0200
From:	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:	Paul Moore <pmoore@...hat.com>
Cc:	netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	selinux@...ho.nsa.gov, jasowang@...hat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 3/3] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap
 devices

On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 12:04:35PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Friday, December 07, 2012 02:25:16 PM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 06, 2012 at 04:09:51PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Thursday, December 06, 2012 10:57:16 PM Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Dec 06, 2012 at 11:56:45AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > > > The SETQUEUE/tun_socket:create_queue permissions do not yet exist in
> > > > > any released SELinux policy as we are just now adding them with this
> > > > > patchset. With current policies loaded into a kernel with this
> > > > > patchset applied the SETQUEUE/tun_socket:create_queue permission would
> > > > > be treated according to the policy's unknown permission setting.
> > > > 
> > > > OK I think we need to rethink what we are doing here: what you sent
> > > > addresses the problem as stated but I think we mis-stated it.  Let me
> > > > try to restate the problem: it is not just selinux problem. Let's assume
> > > > qemu wants to use tun, I (libvirt) don't want to run it as root.
> > > > 
> > > > 1. TUNSETIFF: I can open tun, attach an fd and pass it to qemu.
> > > > Now, qemu does not invoke TUNSETIFF so it can run without
> > > > kernel priveledges.
> > > 
> > > Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe libvirt does this while running as
> > > root.  Assuming that is the case, why not simply setuid()/setgid() to the
> > > same credentials as the QEMU instance before creating the TUN device? 
> > > You can always (re)configure the device afterwards while running as
> > > root/CAP_NET_ADMIN.
> > 
> > We want isolation between qemu instances.
> 
> Understood, I agree.
> 
> Achieving separation via SELinux is easily done, with libvirt/sVirt already 
> doing this for us automatically in most cases; the only thing we will want to 
> do is make sure the SELinux policy is aware of the new permission.
> 
> Achieving separation via DAC should also be easily done, simply run each QEMU 
> instance with a separate UID and/or GID.
> 
> > Giving qemu right to open tun and SETIFF would give it rights
> > to access any tun device.
> 
> I'm quickly looked at tun_chr_open() again and I don't see any special 
> rights/privileges required, the same for tun_chr_ioctl() and 
> __tun_chr_ioctl().  Looking at tun_set_queue() I see we call tun_not_capable() 
> which does a simple DAC check; it must have the same UID/GID or have 
> CAP_NET_ADMIN.
> 
> I'm having a hard time seeing the problem you are describing; help me 
> understand.

The issue is guest controls the number of queues in use.
So qemu would be required to be allowed to call tun_set_queue.
If we allow this we have a problem as one qemu will be
able to access any tun.

At least with DAC, looks like there's a problem. SELinux I think
can address this.

> > There could also be user tun users we want them isolated from qemu.
> 
> Once again, should be possible using either SELinux, DAC, or both.
> 
> -- 
> paul moore
> security and virtualization @ redhat
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe netdev" in
the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

Powered by blists - more mailing lists