Message-ID: <20130709221406.GA13671@u109add4315675089e695.ant.amazon.com>
Date:	Tue, 9 Jul 2013 15:14:07 -0700
From:	Matt Wilson <msw@...zon.com>
To:	Annie Li <annie.li@...cle.com>
CC:	<xen-devel@...ts.xensource.com>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
	<Ian.Campbell@...rix.com>, <wei.liu2@...rix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] xen/netback: correctly calculate required slots of
 skb.

On Tue, Jul 09, 2013 at 02:15:20PM +0800, Annie Li wrote:
> When counting required slots for skb, netback directly uses DIV_ROUND_UP to get
> slots required by header data. This is wrong when offset in the page of header
> data is not zero, and is also inconsistent with following calculation for
> required slot in netbk_gop_skb.
> 
> In netbk_gop_skb, required slots are calculated based on offset and len in page
> of header data. It is possible that required slots here is larger than the one
> calculated in earlier netbk_count_requests. This inconsistency directly results
> in rx_req_cons_peek and xen_netbk_rx_ring_full judgement are wrong.
> 
> Then it comes to situation the ring is actually full, but netback thinks it is
> not and continues to create responses. This results in response overlaps request
> in the ring, then grantcopy gets wrong grant reference and throws out error,
> for example "(XEN) grant_table.c:1763:d0 Bad grant reference 2949120", the
> grant reference is invalid value here. Netback returns XEN_NETIF_RSP_ERROR(-1)
> to netfront when grant copy status is error, then netfront gets rx->status
> (the status is -1, not really data size now), and throws out error,
> "kernel: net eth1: rx->offset: 0, size: 4294967295". This issue can be reproduced
> by doing gzip/gunzip in nfs share with mtu = 9000, the guest would panic after
> running such test for a while.

I have a similar (but smaller) patch in my queue that Wei looked over
at the Dublin hackathon. I don't have time to rebase and test it right
now, but let me post it for a second data point.

--msw

> This patch is based on 3.10-rc7.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Annie Li <annie.li@...cle.com>
> ---
>  drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c |   97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  1 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> index 8c20935..7ff9333 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
> @@ -359,51 +359,88 @@ static bool start_new_rx_buffer(int offset, unsigned long size, int head)
>   * the guest. This function is essentially a dry run of
>   * netbk_gop_frag_copy.
>   */
> -unsigned int xen_netbk_count_skb_slots(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
> +static void netbk_get_slots(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb,
> +			    struct page *page, int *copy_off,
> +			    unsigned long size, unsigned long offset,
> +			    int *head, int *count)
>  {
> -	unsigned int count;
> -	int i, copy_off;
> +	unsigned long bytes;
>  
> -	count = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb_headlen(skb), PAGE_SIZE);
> +	/* Data must not cross a page boundary. */
> +	BUG_ON(size + offset > PAGE_SIZE<<compound_order(page));
>  
> -	copy_off = skb_headlen(skb) % PAGE_SIZE;
> +	/* Skip unused frames from start of page */
> +	page += offset >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +	offset &= ~PAGE_MASK;
>  
> -	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size)
> -		count++;
> +	while (size > 0) {
> +		BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE);
> +		BUG_ON(*copy_off > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET);
>  
> -	for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
> -		unsigned long size = skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
> -		unsigned long offset = skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i].page_offset;
> -		unsigned long bytes;
> +		bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
>  
> -		offset &= ~PAGE_MASK;
> +		if (bytes > size)
> +			bytes = size;
>  
> -		while (size > 0) {
> -			BUG_ON(offset >= PAGE_SIZE);
> -			BUG_ON(copy_off > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET);
> +		if (start_new_rx_buffer(*copy_off, bytes, *head)) {
> +			*count = *count + 1;
> +			*copy_off = 0;
> +		}
>  
> -			bytes = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
> +		if (*copy_off + bytes > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET)
> +			bytes = MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET - *copy_off;
>  
> -			if (bytes > size)
> -				bytes = size;
> +		*copy_off += bytes;
>  
> -			if (start_new_rx_buffer(copy_off, bytes, 0)) {
> -				count++;
> -				copy_off = 0;
> -			}
> +		offset += bytes;
> +		size -= bytes;
>  
> -			if (copy_off + bytes > MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET)
> -				bytes = MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET - copy_off;
> +		/* Next frame */
> +		if (offset == PAGE_SIZE && size) {
> +			BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page));
> +			page++;
> +			offset = 0;
> +		}
>  
> -			copy_off += bytes;
> +		if (*head)
> +			*count = *count + 1;
> +		*head = 0; /* There must be something in this buffer now. */
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +unsigned int xen_netbk_count_skb_slots(struct xenvif *vif, struct sk_buff *skb)
> +{
> +	int i, copy_off = 0;
> +	int nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
> +	unsigned char *data;
> +	int head = 1;
> +	unsigned int count = 0;
>  
> -			offset += bytes;
> -			size -= bytes;
> +	if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size)
> +		count++;
>  
> -			if (offset == PAGE_SIZE)
> -				offset = 0;
> -		}
> +	data = skb->data;
> +	while (data < skb_tail_pointer(skb)) {
> +		unsigned int offset = offset_in_page(data);
> +		unsigned int len = PAGE_SIZE - offset;
> +
> +		if (data + len > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
> +			len = skb_tail_pointer(skb) - data;
> +
> +		netbk_get_slots(vif, skb, virt_to_page(data), &copy_off,
> +				len, offset, &head, &count);
> +		data += len;
> +	}
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < nr_frags; i++) {
> +		netbk_get_slots(vif, skb,
> +				skb_frag_page(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]),
> +				&copy_off,
> +				skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]),
> +				skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i].page_offset,
> +				&head, &count);
>  	}
> +
>  	return count;
>  }
>  
--
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