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Message-ID: <20131115184510.GA911@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 13:45:10 -0500
From: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
shemminger@...workplumber.org, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at
core_initcall time
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:33:04AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> Ingo wanted even more
> unpredictability, in the face of total failure from these more dynamic
> sources, so x86 also "seeds" itself with the build string and the
> boot_params. These last two are hardly high entropy, but they should
> at least make 2 different systems not have _identical_ entropy at the
> start. It's far from cryptographically secure, but it's something, I
> hope.
Those are both likely to be the same on some configurations.
On x86, we could maybe hash the dmi tables ? Vendor stupidity aside,
things like serial numbers in those tables _should_ be different.
Dave
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