netdev - Re: [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at core

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Date:	Fri, 15 Nov 2013 11:07:35 -0800
From:	Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:	Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Cc:	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
	Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
	linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at
 core_initcall time

On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:45 AM, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:33:04AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>  > Ingo wanted even more
>  > unpredictability, in the face of total failure from these more dynamic
>  > sources, so x86 also "seeds" itself with the build string and the
>  > boot_params. These last two are hardly high entropy, but they should
>  > at least make 2 different systems not have _identical_ entropy at the
>  > start. It's far from cryptographically secure, but it's something, I
>  > hope.
>
> Those are both likely to be the same on some configurations.
> On x86, we could maybe hash the dmi tables ? Vendor stupidity aside,
> things like serial numbers in those tables _should_ be different.

Yeah, DMI tables were suggested as well. (Hopefully people will start
using -uuid with KVM!) How hard would that be to hook up to the
pre-random-init code?

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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