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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+emFS+Y-=SOE4SM_gAXfR_NWHRXwv8c6CeB7SgGZgKNw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2013 11:07:35 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>,
Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@...hat.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
linux-wireless@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] random: seed random_int_secret at least poorly at
core_initcall time
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:45 AM, Dave Jones <davej@...hat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 10:33:04AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>
> > Ingo wanted even more
> > unpredictability, in the face of total failure from these more dynamic
> > sources, so x86 also "seeds" itself with the build string and the
> > boot_params. These last two are hardly high entropy, but they should
> > at least make 2 different systems not have _identical_ entropy at the
> > start. It's far from cryptographically secure, but it's something, I
> > hope.
>
> Those are both likely to be the same on some configurations.
> On x86, we could maybe hash the dmi tables ? Vendor stupidity aside,
> things like serial numbers in those tables _should_ be different.
Yeah, DMI tables were suggested as well. (Hopefully people will start
using -uuid with KVM!) How hard would that be to hook up to the
pre-random-init code?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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