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Message-ID: <1455306847.2801.45.camel@decadent.org.uk>
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2016 19:54:07 +0000
From: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To: Rainer Weikusat <rweikusat@...ileactivedefense.com>,
Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@...ahn.de>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@...cle.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Karolin Seeger <kseeger@...ba.org>,
Jason Baron <jbaron@...mai.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Arvid Requate <requate@...vention.de>,
Stefan Gohmann <gohmann@...vention.de>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] af_unix: Guard against other == sk in
unix_dgram_sendmsg
On Fri, 2016-02-12 at 13:25 +0000, Rainer Weikusat wrote:
> Philipp Hahn <pmhahn@...ahn.de> writes:
>
> > Hello Rainer,
> >
> > Am 11.02.2016 um 20:37 schrieb Rainer Weikusat:
> > > The unix_dgram_sendmsg routine use the following test
> > >
> > > if (unlikely(unix_peer(other) != sk && unix_recvq_full(other))) {
>
> [...]
>
> > > This isn't correct as the> specified address could have been bound to
> > > the sending socket itself
>
> [...]
>
> > After applying that patch at least my machine running the samba test no
> > longer crashes.
>
> There's a possible gotcha in there: Send-to-self used to be limited by
> the queue limit. But the rationale for that (IIRC) was that someone
> could keep using newly created sockets to queue ever more data to a
> single, unrelated receiver. I don't think this should apply when
> receiving and sending sockets are identical. But that's just my
> opinion. The other option would be to avoid the unix_state_double_lock
> for sk == other.
Given that unix_state_double_lock() already handles sk == other, I'm
not sure why you think it needs to be avoided.
> I'd be willing to change this accordingly if someone
> thinks the queue limit should apply to send-to-self.
If we don't check the queue limit here, does anything else prevent the
queue growing to the point it's a DoS?
Ben.
--
Ben Hutchings
I say we take off; nuke the site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure.
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