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Message-Id: <20160520.112406.286390667027285394.davem@davemloft.net>
Date: Fri, 20 May 2016 11:24:06 -0700 (PDT)
From: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
To: daniel@...earbox.net
Cc: hannes@...essinduktion.org, alexei.starovoitov@...il.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] bpf: rather use get_random_int for randomizations
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Date: Wed, 18 May 2016 14:14:28 +0200
> Start address randomization and blinding in BPF currently use
> prandom_u32(). prandom_u32() values are not exposed to unpriviledged
> user space to my knowledge, but given other kernel facilities such as
> ASLR, stack canaries, etc make use of stronger get_random_int(), we
> better make use of it here as well given blinding requests successively
> new random values. get_random_int() has minimal entropy pool depletion,
> is not cryptographically secure, but doesn't need to be for our use
> cases here.
>
> Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Ok, applied, thanks Daniel.
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