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Message-ID: <20160919203945.GB888@salvia>
Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2016 22:39:45 +0200
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc: Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>, htejun@...com,
daniel@...earbox.net, ast@...com, davem@...emloft.net,
kafai@...com, fw@...len.de, harald@...hat.com,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, sargun@...gun.me, cgroups@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] net: ipv4, ipv6: run cgroup eBPF egress programs
On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 01:13:27PM -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 09:19:10PM +0200, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
[...]
> > 2) This will turn the stack into a nightmare to debug I predict. If
> > any process with CAP_NET_ADMIN can potentially attach bpf blobs
> > via these hooks, we will have to include in the network stack
>
> a process without CAP_NET_ADMIN can attach bpf blobs to
> system calls via seccomp. bpf is already used for security and policing.
That is a local mechanism, it applies to parent process and child
processes, just like SO_ATTACH_FILTER.
The usecase that we're discussing here enforces a global policy.
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