netdev - Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] net: ipv4, ipv6: run cgroup eBPF egress programs

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Message-ID: <83afdc54-1bbe-3530-e5fd-b74fefe9a042@zonque.org>
Date:   Mon, 19 Sep 2016 22:56:14 +0200
From:   Daniel Mack <daniel@...que.org>
To:     Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>
Cc:     htejun@...com, daniel@...earbox.net, ast@...com,
        davem@...emloft.net, kafai@...com, fw@...len.de, harald@...hat.com,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, sargun@...gun.me, cgroups@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 5/6] net: ipv4, ipv6: run cgroup eBPF egress programs

On 09/19/2016 10:35 PM, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 09:30:02PM +0200, Daniel Mack wrote:
>> On 09/19/2016 09:19 PM, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:

>>> Actually, did you look at Google's approach to this problem?  They
>>> want to control this at socket level, so you restrict what the process
>>> can actually bind. That is enforcing the policy way before you even
>>> send packets. On top of that, what they submitted is infrastructured
>>> so any process with CAP_NET_ADMIN can access that policy that is being
>>> applied and fetch a readable policy through kernel interface.
>>
>> Yes, I've seen what they propose, but I want this approach to support
>> accounting, and so the code has to look at each and every packet in
>> order to count bytes and packets. Do you know of any better place to put
>> the hook then?
> 
> Accounting is part of the usecase that fits into the "network
> introspection" idea that has been mentioned here, so you can achieve
> this by adding a hook that returns no verdict, so this becomes similar
> to the tracing infrastructure.

Why would we artificially limit the use-cases of this implementation if
the way it stands, both filtering and introspection are possible?

> Filtering packets with cgroups is braindead.

Filtering is done via eBPF, and cgroups are just the containers. I don't
see what's brain-dead in that approach. After all, accessing the cgroup
once we have a local socket is really fast, so the idea is kinda obvious.

> You have the means to ensure that processes send no packets via
> restricting port binding, there is no reason to do this any later for
> locally generated traffic.

Yes, restricting port binding can be done on top, if people are worried
about the performance overhead of a per-packet program.



Thanks,
Daniel