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Message-ID: <CACby=p=pjsSmu8EWWomm-MLE2E+H9BSs9Y2ZAiH2Jh67gScMsw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 1 Nov 2016 12:59:02 -0700
From: Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch>
To: Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
roopa <roopa@...ulusnetworks.com>,
Linux Kernel Network Developers <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v2 0/5] bpf: BPF for lightweight tunnel encapsulation
On 1 November 2016 at 12:27, Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 1, 2016 at 12:11 PM, Thomas Graf <tgraf@...g.ch> wrote:
>> You can do the same with act_pedit or cls_bpf at dev_queue_xmit()
>> before or after you go into the encapsulation device. This is a tool
>> for root, if you install a drop all ssh rule then you won't be able to
>> log into the box anymore. If you modify the packet and render it
>> invalid, the packet will be dropped.
>> If you attach a VLAN header while VLAN offload is already set up, then
>> the hardware will add another VLAN header, this is what I would
>> expect. I truly hope that we don't have code which crashes if we
>> dev_queue_xmit() garbage into any device. That would be horrible.
>>
>> Do you have a specific example that could be a problem?
>
> I believe Alexander was dealing with problems where drivers were not
> properly handling IP extension headers. We regularly get reports about
There are many ways to cause IP extension headers to be inserted. How
is this specific to BPF or this series?
> driver checksum failures on edge conditions. Making a fully functional
Not sure what an "edge condition" is? Untrusted networks? How is
drivers crashing on receive related to this series?
> and efficient transmit data path is nontrivial, there are many
> assumptions being made some documented some not. When drivers crash we
> either fix the driver or the protocol stack that is doing something
> bad.
Tom, we have a dozen ways to modify packet content already and we have
multiple ways to take raw packet data from userspace and inject them
at dev_queue_xmit() level and some even above. What is different for
lwtunnel_xmit()?
This is entirely optional and nobody is forced to use any of this. If
you don't trust the BPF program then you better not run in. It's about
the same as trusting a random tc filter or iptables ruleset. The
important point is that integrity is maintained at all times.I would
love to address any specific concern.
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