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Message-ID: <CAHmME9oEhmqW3320Ch+Rczu_=CxQyUQXCGLnYjDm-CYbWugnSw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2016 23:18:48 +0100
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
To: George Spelvin <linux@...encehorizons.net>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
David Laight <David.Laight@...lab.com>,
"Daniel J . Bernstein" <djb@...yp.to>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>,
Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Tom Herbert <tom@...bertland.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF
On Fri, Dec 16, 2016 at 11:13 PM, George Spelvin
<linux@...encehorizons.net> wrote:
> Remembering that on "real" machines it's full SipHash, then I'd say that
> 64-bit security + rekeying seems reasonable.
64-bit security for an RNG is not reasonable even with rekeying. No no
no. Considering we already have a massive speed-up here with the
secure version, there's zero reason to start weakening the security
because we're trigger happy with our benchmarks. No no no.
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