[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1490149348.16816.135.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2017 19:22:28 -0700
From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>
To: David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>
Cc: netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] ipv4: provide stronger user input validation in
nl_fib_input()
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
Alexander reported a KMSAN splat caused by reads of uninitialized
field (tb_id_in) from user provided struct fib_result_nl
It turns out nl_fib_input() sanity tests on user input is a bit
wrong :
User can pretend nlh->nlmsg_len is big enough, but provide
at sendmsg() time a too small buffer.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>
---
net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
index 42bfd08109dd78ab509493e8d2205d72845bb3eb..8f2133ffc2ff1b94871408a5f934cb938d3462b5 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c
@@ -1083,7 +1083,8 @@ static void nl_fib_input(struct sk_buff *skb)
net = sock_net(skb->sk);
nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
- if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
+ if (skb->len < nlmsg_total_size(sizeof(*frn)) ||
+ skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
nlmsg_len(nlh) < sizeof(*frn))
return;
Powered by blists - more mailing lists