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Message-ID: <20170418155949.1028-1-david.lebrun@uclouvain.be>
Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2017 17:59:49 +0200
From: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@...ouvain.be>
To: <netdev@...r.kernel.org>
CC: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@...ouvain.be>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] ipv6: sr: fix out-of-bounds access in SRH validation
This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in seg6_validate_srh() when the
trailing data is less than sizeof(struct sr6_tlv).
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <david.lebrun@...ouvain.be>
---
net/ipv6/seg6.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6.c b/net/ipv6/seg6.c
index a855eb3..5f44ffe 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/seg6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/seg6.c
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ bool seg6_validate_srh(struct ipv6_sr_hdr *srh, int len)
struct sr6_tlv *tlv;
unsigned int tlv_len;
+ if (trailing < sizeof(*tlv))
+ return false;
+
tlv = (struct sr6_tlv *)((unsigned char *)srh + tlv_offset);
tlv_len = sizeof(*tlv) + tlv->len;
--
2.10.2
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