lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CAG-2HqXokzbsDt5Mt5VRyE=FFpUtfVe3YFhEhxuHv0b1KR7Wmw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 17 Jul 2017 14:25:00 +0200
From:   Tom Gundersen <teg@...m.no>
To:     David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
Cc:     netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@...il.com>,
        Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alban Crequy <alban.crequy@...labora.co.uk>,
        Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@...labora.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net/unix: drop obsolete fd-recursion limits

On Mon, Jul 17, 2017 at 11:35 AM, David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com> wrote:
> All unix sockets now account inflight FDs to the respective sender.
> This was introduced in:
>
>     commit 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593
>     Author: willy tarreau <w@....eu>
>     Date:   Sun Jan 10 07:54:56 2016 +0100
>
>         unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
>
> and further refined in:
>
>     commit 415e3d3e90ce9e18727e8843ae343eda5a58fad6
>     Author: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>
>     Date:   Wed Feb 3 02:11:03 2016 +0100
>
>         unix: correctly track in-flight fds in sending process user_struct
>
> Hence, regardless of the stacking depth of FDs, the total number of
> inflight FDs is limited, and accounted. There is no known way for a
> local user to exceed those limits or exploit the accounting.
>
> Furthermore, the GC logic is independent of the recursion/stacking depth
> as well. It solely depends on the total number of inflight FDs,
> regardless of their layout.
>
> Lastly, the current `recursion_level' suffers a TOCTOU race, since it
> checks and inherits depths only at queue time. If we consider `A<-B' to
> mean `queue-B-on-A', the following sequence circumvents the recursion
> level easily:
>
>     A<-B
>        B<-C
>           C<-D
>              ...
>                Y<-Z
>
> resulting in:
>
>     A<-B<-C<-...<-Z
>
> With all of this in mind, lets drop the recursion limit. It has no
> additional security value, anymore. On the contrary, it randomly
> confuses message brokers that try to forward file-descriptors, since
> any sendmsg(2) call can fail spuriously with ETOOMANYREFS if a client
> maliciously modifies the FD while inflight.
>
> Cc: Alban Crequy <alban.crequy@...labora.co.uk>
> Cc: Simon McVittie <simon.mcvittie@...labora.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@...il.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Gundersen <teg@...m.no>
> ---
>  include/net/af_unix.h |  1 -
>  net/unix/af_unix.c    | 24 +-----------------------
>  2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 24 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> index 678e4d6fa317..3b3194b2fc65 100644
> --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> @@ -58,7 +58,6 @@ struct unix_sock {
>         struct list_head        link;
>         atomic_long_t           inflight;
>         spinlock_t              lock;
> -       unsigned char           recursion_level;
>         unsigned long           gc_flags;
>  #define UNIX_GC_CANDIDATE      0
>  #define UNIX_GC_MAYBE_CYCLE    1
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 7b52a380d710..5c53f22d62e8 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -1528,26 +1528,13 @@ static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
>         return false;
>  }
>
> -#define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4
> -
>  static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>  {
>         int i;
> -       unsigned char max_level = 0;
>
>         if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
>                 return -ETOOMANYREFS;
>
> -       for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
> -               struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
> -
> -               if (sk)
> -                       max_level = max(max_level,
> -                                       unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level);
> -       }
> -       if (unlikely(max_level > MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL))
> -               return -ETOOMANYREFS;
> -
>         /*
>          * Need to duplicate file references for the sake of garbage
>          * collection.  Otherwise a socket in the fps might become a
> @@ -1559,7 +1546,7 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
>
>         for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
>                 unix_inflight(scm->fp->user, scm->fp->fp[i]);
> -       return max_level;
> +       return 0;
>  }
>
>  static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
> @@ -1649,7 +1636,6 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>         struct sk_buff *skb;
>         long timeo;
>         struct scm_cookie scm;
> -       int max_level;
>         int data_len = 0;
>         int sk_locked;
>
> @@ -1701,7 +1687,6 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>         err = unix_scm_to_skb(&scm, skb, true);
>         if (err < 0)
>                 goto out_free;
> -       max_level = err + 1;
>
>         skb_put(skb, len - data_len);
>         skb->data_len = data_len;
> @@ -1819,8 +1804,6 @@ static int unix_dgram_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>                 __net_timestamp(skb);
>         maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
>         skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
> -       if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
> -               unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
>         unix_state_unlock(other);
>         other->sk_data_ready(other);
>         sock_put(other);
> @@ -1855,7 +1838,6 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>         int sent = 0;
>         struct scm_cookie scm;
>         bool fds_sent = false;
> -       int max_level;
>         int data_len;
>
>         wait_for_unix_gc();
> @@ -1905,7 +1887,6 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>                         kfree_skb(skb);
>                         goto out_err;
>                 }
> -               max_level = err + 1;
>                 fds_sent = true;
>
>                 skb_put(skb, size - data_len);
> @@ -1925,8 +1906,6 @@ static int unix_stream_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
>
>                 maybe_add_creds(skb, sock, other);
>                 skb_queue_tail(&other->sk_receive_queue, skb);
> -               if (max_level > unix_sk(other)->recursion_level)
> -                       unix_sk(other)->recursion_level = max_level;
>                 unix_state_unlock(other);
>                 other->sk_data_ready(other);
>                 sent += size;
> @@ -2324,7 +2303,6 @@ static int unix_stream_read_generic(struct unix_stream_read_state *state,
>                 last_len = last ? last->len : 0;
>  again:
>                 if (skb == NULL) {
> -                       unix_sk(sk)->recursion_level = 0;
>                         if (copied >= target)
>                                 goto unlock;
>
> --
> 2.13.2
>

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ