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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhQwjNLbh6=s=YB4_CogYbxfeO+5q0WZcR5M9q-6irJDmQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 23 Oct 2017 19:27:57 -0400
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Chenbo Feng <chenbofeng.kernel@...il.com>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, SELinux <Selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
        lorenzo@...gle.com, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
        Chenbo Feng <fengc@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v7 4/5] selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF
 syscall operations

On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 4:00 PM, Chenbo Feng
<chenbofeng.kernel@...il.com> wrote:
> From: Chenbo Feng <fengc@...gle.com>
>
> Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
> implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
> identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
> selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
> of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
> cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
>
> Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@...gle.com>
> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>
> ---
>  security/selinux/hooks.c            | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  security/selinux/include/classmap.h |   2 +
>  security/selinux/include/objsec.h   |   4 ++
>  3 files changed, 117 insertions(+)

Not sure if DaveM has merged this into net-next yet, but it looks
reasonable to me.

Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>

> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index f5d304736852..12cf7de8cbed 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@
>  #include <linux/export.h>
>  #include <linux/msg.h>
>  #include <linux/shm.h>
> +#include <linux/bpf.h>
>
>  #include "avc.h"
>  #include "objsec.h"
> @@ -6252,6 +6253,106 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
>  }
>  #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> +static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
> +                                    unsigned int size)
> +{
> +       u32 sid = current_sid();
> +       int ret;
> +
> +       switch (cmd) {
> +       case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
> +               ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
> +                                  NULL);
> +               break;
> +       case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
> +               ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
> +                                  NULL);
> +               break;
> +       default:
> +               ret = 0;
> +               break;
> +       }
> +
> +       return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
> +{
> +       u32 av = 0;
> +
> +       if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
> +               av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
> +       if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
> +               av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
> +       return av;
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
> +{
> +       u32 sid = current_sid();
> +       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> +
> +       bpfsec = map->security;
> +       return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
> +                           bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> +{
> +       u32 sid = current_sid();
> +       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> +
> +       bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
> +       return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
> +                           BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
> +{
> +       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> +
> +       bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
> +       if (!bpfsec)
> +               return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +       bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
> +       map->security = bpfsec;
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
> +{
> +       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
> +
> +       map->security = NULL;
> +       kfree(bpfsec);
> +}
> +
> +static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> +{
> +       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> +
> +       bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
> +       if (!bpfsec)
> +               return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +       bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
> +       aux->security = bpfsec;
> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
> +{
> +       struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
> +
> +       aux->security = NULL;
> +       kfree(bpfsec);
> +}
> +#endif
> +
>  static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
> @@ -6471,6 +6572,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
>         LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
>  #endif
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
> +       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
> +#endif
>  };
>
>  static __init int selinux_init(void)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 35ffb29a69cb..0a7023b5f000 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -237,6 +237,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
>           { "access", NULL } },
>         { "infiniband_endport",
>           { "manage_subnet", NULL } },
> +       { "bpf",
> +         {"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} },
>         { NULL }
>    };
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> index 1649cd18eb0b..3d54468ce334 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
> @@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ struct pkey_security_struct {
>         u32     sid;    /* SID of pkey */
>  };
>
> +struct bpf_security_struct {
> +       u32 sid;  /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
> +};
> +
>  extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
>
>  #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
> --
> 2.15.0.rc1.287.g2b38de12cc-goog
>



-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com

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