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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTtsAV2rM-5gkXwSQtQwA2ZJ7EvrgMw9cd++qF+ahGGig@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Oct 2017 19:28:26 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Chenbo Feng <chenbofeng.kernel@...il.com>
Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org, SELinux <Selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@...gle.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
lorenzo@...gle.com, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>,
Chenbo Feng <fengc@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v7 5/5] selinux: bpf: Add addtional check for bpf
object file receive
On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 4:00 PM, Chenbo Feng
<chenbofeng.kernel@...il.com> wrote:
> From: Chenbo Feng <fengc@...gle.com>
>
> Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files
> through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the receiving
> process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf program.
> This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a
> anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking the
> files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly on
> eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is configured.
>
> Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@...gle.com>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>
> ---
> include/linux/bpf.h | 3 +++
> kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 4 ++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Same thing as 4/5.
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
> index 84c192da3e0b..1e334b248ff6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ int bpf_prog_array_copy_to_user(struct bpf_prog_array __rcu *progs,
> #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> DECLARE_PER_CPU(int, bpf_prog_active);
>
> +extern const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops;
> +extern const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops;
> +
> #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name) \
> extern const struct bpf_prog_ops _name ## _prog_ops; \
> extern const struct bpf_verifier_ops _name ## _verifier_ops;
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> index 5cb56d06b48d..323be2473c4b 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
> @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static ssize_t bpf_dummy_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> -static const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
> +const struct file_operations bpf_map_fops = {
> #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
> .show_fdinfo = bpf_map_show_fdinfo,
> #endif
> @@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ static void bpf_prog_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
> }
> #endif
>
> -static const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
> +const struct file_operations bpf_prog_fops = {
> #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
> .show_fdinfo = bpf_prog_show_fdinfo,
> #endif
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 12cf7de8cbed..2e3a627fc0b1 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -1815,6 +1815,10 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
> return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> +static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
> +#endif
> +
> /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
> access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
> descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
> @@ -1845,6 +1849,12 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
> goto out;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +#endif
> +
> /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
> rc = 0;
> if (av)
> @@ -2165,6 +2175,12 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
> return rc;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
> + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +#endif
> +
> if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
> return 0;
>
> @@ -6288,6 +6304,39 @@ static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
> return av;
> }
>
> +/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
> + * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
> + * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
> + * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
> + * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
> + * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
> + * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
> + */
> +static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
> +{
> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
> + struct bpf_prog *prog;
> + struct bpf_map *map;
> + int ret;
> +
> + if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
> + map = file->private_data;
> + bpfsec = map->security;
> + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
> + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
> + prog = file->private_data;
> + bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
> + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
> + BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
> {
> u32 sid = current_sid();
> --
> 2.15.0.rc1.287.g2b38de12cc-goog
>
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
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