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Message-ID: <20180110194733.GO9723@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 19:47:33 +0000
From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>,
Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
kernel-team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf] bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation
Hi again Linus, Alexei,
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 10:21:29AM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 08, 2018 at 10:49:01AM -0800, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> > In this particular case, we should be very much aware of future CPU's
> > being more _constrained_, because CPU vendors had better start taking
> > this thing into account.
> >
> > So the masking approach is FUNDAMENTALLY SAFER than the "let's try to
> > limit control speculation".
> >
> > If somebody can point to a CPU that actually speculates across an
> > address masking operation, I will be very surprised. And unless you
> > can point to that, then stop trying to dismiss the masking approach.
>
> Whilst I agree with your comments about future CPUs, this stuff is further
> out of academia than you might think. We're definitely erring on the
> belt-and-braces side of things at the moment, so let me go check what's
> *actually* been built and I suspect we'll be able to make the masking work.
>
> Stay tuned...
I can happily confirm that there aren't any (ARM architecture) CPUs where
the masking approach is not sufficient, so there's no need to worry about
value speculation breaking this.
Will
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