[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20180122112415.GA41074@beast>
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2018 03:24:15 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@...cle.com>
Cc: Honggang Li <honli@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@...cle.com>,
Steve Beattie <sbeattie@...ntu.com>,
Andy Whitcroft <apw@...onical.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Jay Fenlason <fenlason@...hat.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org, rds-devel@....oracle.com
Subject: [PATCH] RDS: Fix rds-ping inducing kernel panic
As described in: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=822754
Attempting an RDS connection from the IP address of an IPoIB interface
to itself causes a kernel panic due to a BUG_ON() being triggered.
Making the test less strict allows rds-ping to work without crashing
the machine.
A local unprivileged user could use this flaw to crash the sytem.
I think this fix was written by Jay Fenlason <fenlason@...hat.com>,
and extracted from the RedHat kernel patches here:
https://oss.oracle.com/git/gitweb.cgi?p=redpatch.git;a=commitdiff;h=c7b6a0a1d8d636852be130fa15fa8be10d4704e8
This fix appears to have been carried by at least RedHat, Oracle, and
Ubuntu for several years.
CVE-2012-2372
Reported-by: Honggang Li <honli@...hat.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
---
This is what I get for researching CVE lifetimes...
---
net/rds/ib_send.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/rds/ib_send.c b/net/rds/ib_send.c
index 8557a1cae041..5fbf635d17cb 100644
--- a/net/rds/ib_send.c
+++ b/net/rds/ib_send.c
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ int rds_ib_xmit(struct rds_connection *conn, struct rds_message *rm,
int flow_controlled = 0;
int nr_sig = 0;
- BUG_ON(off % RDS_FRAG_SIZE);
+ BUG_ON(!conn->c_loopback && off % RDS_FRAG_SIZE);
BUG_ON(hdr_off != 0 && hdr_off != sizeof(struct rds_header));
/* Do not send cong updates to IB loopback */
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists