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Message-ID: <20190817150843.4vsmzpwpcvzndjld@ast-mbp>
Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2019 08:08:45 -0700
From: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Kernel Team <Kernel-team@...com>,
Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 12:22:53AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
>
> (The one usecase I'd care about is to extend seccomp to do pointer-based
> syscall filtering. Whether or not that'd require (unprivileged) ebpf is
> up for discussion at KSummit.)
Kees have been always against using ebpf in seccomp. I believe he still
holds this opinion. Until he changes his mind let's stop bringing seccomp
as a use case for unpriv bpf.
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