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Message-ID: <61B88085-9FBB-41E6-9783-324E445E428D@ubuntu.com>
Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2019 17:16:53 +0200
From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Kernel Team <Kernel-team@...com>,
Lorenz Bauer <lmb@...udflare.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
On August 17, 2019 5:08:45 PM GMT+02:00, Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> wrote:
>On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 12:22:53AM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
>>
>> (The one usecase I'd care about is to extend seccomp to do
>pointer-based
>> syscall filtering. Whether or not that'd require (unprivileged) ebpf
>is
>> up for discussion at KSummit.)
>
>Kees have been always against using ebpf in seccomp. I believe he still
>holds this opinion. Until he changes his mind let's stop bringing
>seccomp
>as a use case for unpriv bpf.
That's why I said "whether or not".
For the record, I do prefer a non-unpriv-ebpf way.
It's still something that will most surely come up in the discussion though.
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