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Message-ID: <87zhk2faqg.fsf@netronome.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2019 22:51:35 +0100
From: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@...ronome.com>
To: "Naveen N. Rao" <naveen.n.rao@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@...ronome.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>, bpf@...r.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] bpf: handle 32-bit zext during constant blinding
Naveen N. Rao writes:
> Since BPF constant blinding is performed after the verifier pass, the
> ALU32 instructions inserted for doubleword immediate loads don't have a
> corresponding zext instruction. This is causing a kernel oops on powerpc
> and can be reproduced by running 'test_cgroup_storage' with
> bpf_jit_harden=2.
>
> Fix this by emitting BPF_ZEXT during constant blinding if
> prog->aux->verifier_zext is set.
>
> Fixes: a4b1d3c1ddf6cb ("bpf: verifier: insert zero extension according to analysis result")
> Reported-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>
> Signed-off-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>
Thanks for the fix.
Reviewed-by: Jiong Wang <jiong.wang@...ronome.com>
Just two other comments during review in case I am wrong on somewhere.
- Use verifier_zext instead of bpf_jit_needs_zext() seems better, even
though the latter could avoid extending function argument.
Because JIT back-ends look at verifier_zext, true means zext inserted
by verifier so JITs won't do the code-gen.
Use verifier_zext is sort of keeping JIT blinding the same behaviour
has verifier even though blinding doesn't belong to verifier, but for
such insn patching, it could be seen as a extension of verifier,
therefore use verifier_zext seems better than bpf_jit_needs_zext() to
me.
- JIT blinding is also escaping the HI32 randomization which happens
inside verifier, otherwise x86-64 regression should have caught this issue.
Regards,
Jiong
> ---
> Changes since RFC:
> - Removed changes to ALU32 and JMP32 ops since those don't alter program
> execution, and the verifier would have already accounted for them.
>
>
> kernel/bpf/core.c | 8 ++++++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> index 8191a7db2777..66088a9e9b9e 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
> @@ -890,7 +890,8 @@ int bpf_jit_get_func_addr(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
>
> static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,
> const struct bpf_insn *aux,
> - struct bpf_insn *to_buff)
> + struct bpf_insn *to_buff,
> + bool emit_zext)
> {
> struct bpf_insn *to = to_buff;
> u32 imm_rnd = get_random_int();
> @@ -1005,6 +1006,8 @@ static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,
> case 0: /* Part 2 of BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW. */
> *to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_MOV, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd ^ aux[0].imm);
> *to++ = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_XOR, BPF_REG_AX, imm_rnd);
> + if (emit_zext)
> + *to++ = BPF_ZEXT_REG(BPF_REG_AX);
> *to++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, aux[0].dst_reg, BPF_REG_AX);
> break;
>
> @@ -1088,7 +1091,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_jit_blind_constants(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> insn[1].code == 0)
> memcpy(aux, insn, sizeof(aux));
>
> - rewritten = bpf_jit_blind_insn(insn, aux, insn_buff);
> + rewritten = bpf_jit_blind_insn(insn, aux, insn_buff,
> + clone->aux->verifier_zext);
> if (!rewritten)
> continue;
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