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Message-ID: <20191204140827.GB12431@krava>
Date:   Wed, 4 Dec 2019 15:08:27 +0100
From:   Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>
To:     Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc:     Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
        bpf@...r.kernel.org, linux-audit@...hat.com,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
        Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@...ronome.com>,
        Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
        David Miller <davem@...hat.com>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Jiri Benc <jbenc@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC] bpf: Emit audit messages upon successful prog load and
 unload

On Tue, Dec 03, 2019 at 09:53:16PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:

SNIP

> > >
> > > static inline void audit_foo(...)
> > > {
> > >   if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
> > >     __audit_foo(...)
> > > }
> >
> > bpf_audit_prog might be called outside of syscall context for UNLOAD event,
> > so that would prevent it from being stored
> 
> Okay, right.  More on this below ...
> 
> > I can see audit_log_start checks on value of audit_context() that we pass in,
> 
> The check in audit_log_start() is for a different reason; it checks
> the passed context to see if it should associate the record with
> others in the same event, e.g. PATH records associated with the
> matching SYSCALL record.  This way all the associated records show up
> as part of the same event (as defined by the audit timestamp).
> 
> > should we check for audit_dummy_context just for load event? like:
> >
> >
> > static void bpf_audit_prog(const struct bpf_prog *prog, enum bpf_audit op)
> > {
> >         struct audit_buffer *ab;
> >
> >         if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
> >                 return;
> >         if (op == BPF_AUDIT_LOAD && audit_dummy_context())
> >                 return;
> >         ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_BPF);
> >         if (unlikely(!ab))
> >                 return;
> >         ...
> > }
> 
> Ignoring the dummy context for a minute, there is likely a larger
> issue here with using audit_context() when bpf_audit_prog() is called
> outside of a syscall, e.g. BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD.  In this case we likely
> shouldn't be taking the audit context from the current task, we
> shouldn't be taking it from anywhere, it should be NULL.
> 
> As far as the dummy context is concerned, you might want to skip the
> dummy context check since you can only do that on the LOAD side, which
> means that depending on the system's configuration you could end up
> with a number of unbalanced LOAD/UNLOAD events.  The downside is that
> you are always going to get the BPF audit records on systemd based
> systems, since they ignore the admin's audit configuration and always
> enable audit (yes, we've tried to get systemd to change, they don't
> seem to care).

ok, so something like below?

thanks,
jirka


---
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h |  1 +
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c       | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index c89c6495983d..32a5db900f47 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@
 #define AUDIT_FANOTIFY		1331	/* Fanotify access decision */
 #define AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET	1332	/* Timekeeping offset injected */
 #define AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL	1333	/* NTP value adjustment */
+#define AUDIT_BPF		1334	/* BPF subsystem */
 
 #define AUDIT_AVC		1400	/* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
 #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR	1401	/* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index e3461ec59570..81f1a6308aa8 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/timekeeping.h>
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/btf.h>
 
 #define IS_FD_ARRAY(map) ((map)->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY || \
@@ -1306,6 +1307,33 @@ static int find_prog_type(enum bpf_prog_type type, struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+enum bpf_audit {
+	BPF_AUDIT_LOAD,
+	BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD,
+};
+
+static const char * const bpf_audit_str[] = {
+	[BPF_AUDIT_LOAD]   = "LOAD",
+	[BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD] = "UNLOAD",
+};
+
+static void bpf_audit_prog(const struct bpf_prog *prog, enum bpf_audit op)
+{
+	struct audit_context *ctx = NULL;
+	struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+	if (audit_enabled == AUDIT_OFF)
+		return;
+	if (op == BPF_AUDIT_LOAD)
+		ctx = audit_context();
+	ab = audit_log_start(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_BPF);
+	if (unlikely(!ab))
+		return;
+	audit_log_format(ab, "prog-id=%u op=%s",
+			 prog->aux->id, bpf_audit_str[op]);
+	audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
 int __bpf_prog_charge(struct user_struct *user, u32 pages)
 {
 	unsigned long memlock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -1421,6 +1449,7 @@ static void __bpf_prog_put(struct bpf_prog *prog, bool do_idr_lock)
 {
 	if (atomic64_dec_and_test(&prog->aux->refcnt)) {
 		perf_event_bpf_event(prog, PERF_BPF_EVENT_PROG_UNLOAD, 0);
+		bpf_audit_prog(prog, BPF_AUDIT_UNLOAD);
 		/* bpf_prog_free_id() must be called first */
 		bpf_prog_free_id(prog, do_idr_lock);
 		__bpf_prog_put_noref(prog, true);
@@ -1830,6 +1859,7 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr, union bpf_attr __user *uattr)
 	 */
 	bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(prog);
 	perf_event_bpf_event(prog, PERF_BPF_EVENT_PROG_LOAD, 0);
+	bpf_audit_prog(prog, BPF_AUDIT_LOAD);
 
 	err = bpf_prog_new_fd(prog);
 	if (err < 0)
-- 
2.23.0

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