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Date:   Thu, 06 Feb 2020 11:43:59 -0800
From:   John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
To:     Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>, bpf@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, kernel-team@...udflare.com,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH bpf 0/3] Fix locking order and synchronization on
 sockmap/sockhash tear-down

Jakub Sitnicki wrote:
> Couple of fixes that came from recent discussion [0] on commit
> 7e81a3530206 ("bpf: Sockmap, ensure sock lock held during tear down").
> 
> This series doesn't address the sleeping while holding a spinlock
> problem. We're still trying to decide how to fix that [1].
> 
> Until then sockmap users might see the following warnings:
> 
> | BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/sock.c:2935
> | in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 62, name: kworker/0:1
> | 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/62:
> |  #0: ffff88813b019748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
> |  #1: ffffc900000abe50 ((work_completion)(&map->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
> |  #2: ffff8881381f6df8 (&stab->lock){+...}, at: sock_map_free+0x26/0x180
> | CPU: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.5.0-04008-g7b083332376e #454
> | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
> | Workqueue: events bpf_map_free_deferred
> | Call Trace:
> |  dump_stack+0x71/0xa0
> |  ___might_sleep.cold+0xa6/0xb6
> |  lock_sock_nested+0x28/0x90
> |  sock_map_free+0x5f/0x180
> |  bpf_map_free_deferred+0x58/0x80
> |  process_one_work+0x260/0x5e0
> |  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
> |  kthread+0x108/0x140
> |  ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
> |  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
> |  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> |
> | ======================================================
> | WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
> | 5.5.0-04008-g7b083332376e #454 Tainted: G        W
> | ------------------------------------------------------
> | kworker/0:1/62 is trying to acquire lock:
> | ffff88813b280130 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}, at: sock_map_free+0x5f/0x180
> |
> | but task is already holding lock:
> | ffff8881381f6df8 (&stab->lock){+...}, at: sock_map_free+0x26/0x180
> |
> | which lock already depends on the new lock.
> |
> |
> | the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
> |
> | -> #1 (&stab->lock){+...}:
> |        _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x39/0x80
> |        sock_map_update_common+0xdc/0x300
> |        sock_map_update_elem+0xc3/0x150
> |        __do_sys_bpf+0x1285/0x1620
> |        do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x690
> |        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
> |
> | -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}:
> |        __lock_acquire+0xe2f/0x19f0
> |        lock_acquire+0x95/0x190
> |        lock_sock_nested+0x6b/0x90
> |        sock_map_free+0x5f/0x180
> |        bpf_map_free_deferred+0x58/0x80
> |        process_one_work+0x260/0x5e0
> |        worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
> |        kthread+0x108/0x140
> |        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
> |
> | other info that might help us debug this:
> |
> |  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
> |
> |        CPU0                    CPU1
> |        ----                    ----
> |   lock(&stab->lock);
> |                                lock(sk_lock-AF_INET);
> |                                lock(&stab->lock);
> |   lock(sk_lock-AF_INET);
> |
> |  *** DEADLOCK ***
> |
> | 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/62:
> |  #0: ffff88813b019748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
> |  #1: ffffc900000abe50 ((work_completion)(&map->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
> |  #2: ffff8881381f6df8 (&stab->lock){+...}, at: sock_map_free+0x26/0x180
> |
> | stack backtrace:
> | CPU: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G        W         5.5.0-04008-g7b083332376e #454
> | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
> | Workqueue: events bpf_map_free_deferred
> | Call Trace:
> |  dump_stack+0x71/0xa0
> |  check_noncircular+0x176/0x190
> |  __lock_acquire+0xe2f/0x19f0
> |  lock_acquire+0x95/0x190
> |  ? sock_map_free+0x5f/0x180
> |  lock_sock_nested+0x6b/0x90
> |  ? sock_map_free+0x5f/0x180
> |  sock_map_free+0x5f/0x180
> |  bpf_map_free_deferred+0x58/0x80
> |  process_one_work+0x260/0x5e0
> |  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
> |  kthread+0x108/0x140
> |  ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
> |  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
> |  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Hi Jakub,

Untested at the moment, but this should also be fine per your suggestion
(if I read it correctly).  The reason we have stab->lock and bucket->locks
here is to handle checking EEXIST in update/delete cases. We need to
be careful that when an update happens and we check for EEXIST that the
socket is added/removed during this check. So both map_update_common and
sock_map_delete need to guard from being run together potentially deleting
an entry we are checking, etc. But by the time we get here we just did
a synchronize_rcu() in the line above so no updates/deletes should be
in flight. So it seems safe to drop these locks because of the condition
no updates in flight.

So with patch below we keep the sync rcu but that is fine IMO these
map free's are rare. Take a look and make sure it seems sane to you
as well.

diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c
index f36e13e577a3..1d56ec20330c 100644
--- a/net/core/sock_map.c
+++ b/net/core/sock_map.c
@@ -233,8 +233,11 @@ static void sock_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 	struct bpf_stab *stab = container_of(map, struct bpf_stab, map);
 	int i;
 
+	/* After the sync no updates or deletes will be in-flight so it
+	 * is safe to walk map and remove entries without risking a race
+	 * in EEXIST update case.
+	 */
 	synchronize_rcu();
-	raw_spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock);
 	for (i = 0; i < stab->map.max_entries; i++) {
 		struct sock **psk = &stab->sks[i];
 		struct sock *sk;
@@ -248,7 +251,6 @@ static void sock_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 			release_sock(sk);
 		}
 	}
-	raw_spin_unlock_bh(&stab->lock);
 
 	/* wait for psock readers accessing its map link */
 	synchronize_rcu();
@@ -859,10 +861,13 @@ static void sock_hash_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 	struct hlist_node *node;
 	int i;
 
+	/* After the sync no updates or deletes will be in-flight so it
+	 * is safe to walk hash and remove entries without risking a race
+	 * in EEXIST update case.
+	 */
 	synchronize_rcu();
 	for (i = 0; i < htab->buckets_num; i++) {
 		bucket = sock_hash_select_bucket(htab, i);
-		raw_spin_lock_bh(&bucket->lock);
 		hlist_for_each_entry_safe(elem, node, &bucket->head, node) {
 			hlist_del_rcu(&elem->node);
 			lock_sock(elem->sk);
@@ -871,7 +876,6 @@ static void sock_hash_free(struct bpf_map *map)
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			release_sock(elem->sk);
 		}
-		raw_spin_unlock_bh(&bucket->lock);
 	}
 
 	/* wait for psock readers accessing its map link */

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