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Date:   Fri, 06 Mar 2020 09:31:23 +0100
From:   Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
To:     Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>
Cc:     Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Kernel Team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 0/3] Introduce pinnable bpf_link kernel abstraction

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net> writes:

> On 3/5/20 11:50 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 11:34:18PM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>>> On 3/5/20 5:34 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 11:37:11AM +0100, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen wrote:
>>>>> Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com> writes:
>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 04, 2020 at 08:47:44AM +0100, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen wrote:
>>> [...]
>>>>> Anyway, what I was trying to express:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Still that doesn't mean that pinned link is 'immutable'.
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't mean 'immutable' in the sense that it cannot be removed ever.
>>>>> Just that we may end up in a situation where an application can see a
>>>>> netdev with an XDP program attached, has the right privileges to modify
>>>>> it, but can't because it can't find the pinned bpf_link. Right? Or am I
>>>>> misunderstanding your proposal?
>>>>>
>>>>> Amending my example from before, this could happen by:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Someone attaches a program to eth0, and pins the bpf_link to
>>>>>      /sys/fs/bpf/myprog
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. eth0 is moved to a different namespace which mounts a new sysfs at
>>>>>      /sys
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. Inside that namespace, /sys/fs/bpf/myprog is no longer accessible, so
>>>>>      xdp-loader can't get access to the original bpf_link; but the XDP
>>>>>      program is still attached to eth0.
>>>>
>>>> The key to decide is whether moving netdev across netns should be allowed
>>>> when xdp attached. I think it should be denied. Even when legacy xdp
>>>> program is attached, since it will confuse user space managing part.
>>>
>>> There are perfectly valid use cases where this is done already today (minus
>>> bpf_link), for example, consider an orchestrator that is setting up the BPF
>>> program on the device, moving to the newly created application pod during
>>> the CNI call in k8s, such that the new pod does not have the /sys/fs/bpf/
>>> mount instance and if unprivileged cannot remove the BPF prog from the dev
>>> either. We do something like this in case of ipvlan, meaning, we attach a
>>> rootlet prog that calls into single slot of a tail call map, move it to the
>>> application pod, and only out of Cilium's own pod and it's pod-local bpf fs
>>> instance we manage the pinned tail call map to update the main programs in
>>> that single slot w/o having to switch any netns later on.
>> 
>> Right. You mentioned this use case before, but I managed to forget about it.
>> Totally makes sense for prog to stay attached to netdev when it's moved.
>> I think pod manager would also prefer that pod is not able to replace
>> xdp prog from inside the container. It sounds to me that steps 1,2,3 above
>> is exactly the desired behavior. Otherwise what stops some application
>> that started in a pod to override it?
>
> Generally, yes, and it shouldn't need to care nor see what is happening in
> /sys/fs/bpf/ from the orchestrator at least (or could potentially have its
> own private mount under /sys/fs/bpf/ or elsewhere). Ideally, the behavior
> should be that orchestrator does all the setup out of its own namespace,
> then moves everything over to the newly created target namespace and e.g.
> only if the pod has the capable(cap_sys_admin) permissions, it could mess
> around with anything attached there, or via similar model as done in [0]
> when there is a master device.

Yup, I can see how this can be a reasonable use case where you *would*
want the locking. However, my concern is that there should be a way for
an admin to recover from this (say, if it happens by mistake, or a
misbehaving application). Otherwise, I fear we'll end up with support
cases where the only answer is "try rebooting", which is obviously not
ideal.

> Last time I looked, there is a down/up cycle on the dev upon netns
> migration and it flushes e.g. attached qdiscs afaik, so there are
> limitations that still need to be addressed. Not sure atm if same is
> happening to XDP right now.

XDP programs will stay attached. devmaps (for redirect) have a notifier
that will remove devices when they move out of a namespace. Not sure if
there are any other issues with netns moves somewhere.

> In this regards veth devices are a bit nicer to work with since
> everything can be attached on hostns ingress w/o needing to worry on
> the peer dev in the pod's netns.

Presumably the XDP EGRESS hook that David Ahern is working on will make
this doable for XDP on veth as well?

-Toke

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