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Message-ID: <eca85e0b-0af3-c43a-31e4-bd5c3f519798@c-s.fr>
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 08:08:22 +0200
From: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@....fr>
To: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>
Cc: linux-mm@...ck.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
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linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-amlogic@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-mediatek@...ts.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] crypto: Remove unnecessary memzero_explicit()
Le 14/04/2020 à 00:28, Waiman Long a écrit :
> Since kfree_sensitive() will do an implicit memzero_explicit(), there
> is no need to call memzero_explicit() before it. Eliminate those
> memzero_explicit() and simplify the call sites. For better correctness,
> the setting of keylen is also moved down after the key pointer check.
>
> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
> ---
> .../allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c | 19 +++++-------------
> .../allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c | 20 +++++--------------
> drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c | 12 +++--------
> drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c | 3 +--
> 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> index aa4e8fdc2b32..8358fac98719 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ce/sun8i-ce-cipher.c
> @@ -366,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ce_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
> {
> struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>
> - if (op->key) {
> - memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> - kfree(op->key);
> - }
> + kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
> pm_runtime_put_sync_suspend(op->ce->dev);
> }
> @@ -391,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
> dev_dbg(ce->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> - if (op->key) {
> - memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> - kfree(op->key);
> - }
> - op->keylen = keylen;
> + kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> if (!op->key)
> return -ENOMEM;
> + op->keylen = keylen;
Does it matter at all to ensure op->keylen is not set when of->key is
NULL ? I'm not sure.
But if it does, then op->keylen should be set to 0 when freeing op->key.
>
> crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> @@ -416,14 +410,11 @@ int sun8i_ce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
> if (err)
> return err;
>
> - if (op->key) {
> - memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> - kfree(op->key);
> - }
> - op->keylen = keylen;
> + kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> if (!op->key)
> return -ENOMEM;
> + op->keylen = keylen;
Same comment as above.
>
> crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> index 5246ef4f5430..0495fbc27fcc 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/allwinner/sun8i-ss/sun8i-ss-cipher.c
> @@ -249,7 +249,6 @@ static int sun8i_ss_cipher(struct skcipher_request *areq)
> offset = areq->cryptlen - ivsize;
> if (rctx->op_dir & SS_DECRYPTION) {
> memcpy(areq->iv, backup_iv, ivsize);
> - memzero_explicit(backup_iv, ivsize);
> kfree_sensitive(backup_iv);
> } else {
> scatterwalk_map_and_copy(areq->iv, areq->dst, offset,
> @@ -367,10 +366,7 @@ void sun8i_ss_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
> {
> struct sun8i_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>
> - if (op->key) {
> - memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> - kfree(op->key);
> - }
> + kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
> pm_runtime_put_sync(op->ss->dev);
> }
> @@ -392,14 +388,11 @@ int sun8i_ss_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
> dev_dbg(ss->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> - if (op->key) {
> - memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> - kfree(op->key);
> - }
> - op->keylen = keylen;
> + kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> if (!op->key)
> return -ENOMEM;
> + op->keylen = keylen;
Same comment as above.
>
> crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> @@ -418,14 +411,11 @@ int sun8i_ss_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> - if (op->key) {
> - memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> - kfree(op->key);
> - }
> - op->keylen = keylen;
> + kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> if (!op->key)
> return -ENOMEM;
> + op->keylen = keylen;
Same comment as above.
>
> crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(op->fallback_tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(op->fallback_tfm, tfm->base.crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> index fd1269900d67..6aa9ce7bbbd4 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/amlogic/amlogic-gxl-cipher.c
> @@ -341,10 +341,7 @@ void meson_cipher_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
> {
> struct meson_cipher_tfm_ctx *op = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
>
> - if (op->key) {
> - memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> - kfree(op->key);
> - }
> + kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> crypto_free_sync_skcipher(op->fallback_tfm);
> }
>
> @@ -368,14 +365,11 @@ int meson_aes_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key,
> dev_dbg(mc->dev, "ERROR: Invalid keylen %u\n", keylen);
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> - if (op->key) {
> - memzero_explicit(op->key, op->keylen);
> - kfree(op->key);
> - }
> - op->keylen = keylen;
> + kfree_sensitive(op->key);
> op->key = kmemdup(key, keylen, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);
> if (!op->key)
> return -ENOMEM;
> + op->keylen = keylen;
Same comment as above.
>
> return crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(op->fallback_tfm, key, keylen);
> }
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
> index 43962bc709c6..4a2d162914de 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/inside-secure/safexcel_hash.c
> @@ -1081,8 +1081,7 @@ static int safexcel_hmac_init_pad(struct ahash_request *areq,
> }
>
> /* Avoid leaking */
> - memzero_explicit(keydup, keylen);
> - kfree(keydup);
> + kfree_sensitive(keydup);
>
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
Christophe
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