Date:   Wed, 15 Apr 2020 11:26:23 +0200
From:   Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
To:     Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
Cc:     Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>, bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
        Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...com>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Kernel Team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH bpf-next 4/8] bpf: support GET_FD_BY_ID and GET_NEXT_ID for bpf_link

Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com> writes:

> On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 3:32 AM Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com> wrote:
>>
>> Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com> writes:
>>
>> >> > After that, one can pin bpf_link temporarily and re-open it as
>> >> > writable one, provided CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE capability is present. All
>> >> > that works already, because pinned bpf_link is just a file, so one can
>> >> > do fchmod on it and all that will go through normal file access
>> >> > permission check code path.
>> >>
>> >> Ah, I did not know that was possible - I was assuming that bpffs was
>> >> doing something special to prevent that. But if not, great!
>> >>
>> >> > Unfortunately, just re-opening same FD as writable (which would
>> >> > be possible if fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, S_IRUSR
>> >> >  S_IWUSR) was supported on Linux) without pinning is not possible.
>> >> > Opening link from /proc/<pid>/fd/<link-fd> doesn't seem to work
>> >> > either, because backing inode is not BPF FS inode. I'm not sure, but
>> >> > maybe we can support the latter eventually. But either way, I think
>> >> > given this is to be used for manual troubleshooting, going through few
>> >> > extra hoops to force-detach bpf_link is actually a good thing.
>> >>
>> >> Hmm, I disagree that deliberately making users jump through hoops is a
>> >> good thing. Smells an awful lot like security through obscurity to me;
>> >> and we all know how well that works anyway...
>> >
>> > Depends on who users are? bpftool can implement this as one of
>> > `bpftool link` sub-commands and allow human operators to force-detach
>> > bpf_link, if necessary.
>>
>> Yeah, I would expect this to be the common way this would be used: built
>> into tools.
>>
>> > I think applications shouldn't do this (programmatically) at all,
>> > which is why I think it's actually good that it's harder and not
>> > obvious, this will make developer think again before implementing
>> > this, hopefully. For me it's about discouraging bad practice.
>>
>> I guess I just don't share your optimism that making people jump through
>> hoops will actually discourage them :)
>
> I understand. I just don't see why would anyone have to implement this
> at all and especially would think it's a good idea to begin with?
>
>>
>> If people know what they are doing it should be enough to document it as
>> discouraged. And if they don't, they are perfectly capable of finding
>> and copy-pasting the sequence of hoop-jumps required to achieve what
>> they want, probably with more bugs added along the way.
>>
>> So in the end I think that all you're really achieving is annoying
>> people who do have a legitimate reason to override the behaviour (which
>> includes yourself as a bpftool developer :)). That's what I meant by the
>> 'security through obscurity' comment.
>
> Can I please get a list of real examples of legitimate reasons to
> override this behavior?

Primarily, I expect that this would be built into admin tools (like
bpftool as you suggested). I just don't see why such tools should be
made to do the whole pin/reopen dance (which, BTW, adds an implicit
dependency on having a mounted bpffs) when we could just add a
capability check directly in bpf_link_get_fd_by_id()?

-Toke

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