netdev - Re: [PATCH] net: phy: mscc: avoid skcipher API for single block AES encryption

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Message-ID: <20200624163229.GC200774@gmail.com>
Date:   Wed, 24 Jun 2020 09:32:29 -0700
From:   Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>
To:     Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
Cc:     netdev@...r.kernel.org, linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org,
        Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@...tlin.com>,
        Andrew Lunn <andrew@...n.ch>,
        Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@...il.com>,
        Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: phy: mscc: avoid skcipher API for single block AES
 encryption

On Wed, Jun 24, 2020 at 03:34:27PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> The skcipher API dynamically instantiates the transformation object on
> request that implements the requested algorithm optimally on the given
> platform. This notion of optimality only matters for cases like bulk
> network or disk encryption, where performance can be a bottleneck, or
> in cases where the algorithm itself is not known at compile time.
> 
> In the mscc macsec case, we are dealing with AES encryption of a single
> block, and so neither concern applies, and we are better off using the
> AES library interface, which is lightweight and safe for this kind of
> use.
> 
> Note that the scatterlist API does not permit references to buffers that
> are located on the stack, so the existing code is incorrect in any case,
> but avoiding the skcipher and scatterlist APIs altogether is the most
> straight-forward approach to fixing this.
> 
> Cc: Antoine Tenart <antoine.tenart@...tlin.com>
> Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@...n.ch>
> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@...il.com>
> Cc: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@...il.com>
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>
> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
> Cc: <stable@...r.kernel.org>
> Fixes: 28c5107aa904e ("net: phy: mscc: macsec support")
> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>
> ---
>  drivers/net/phy/Kconfig            |  3 +-
>  drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_macsec.c | 40 +++++---------------
>  2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/Kconfig b/drivers/net/phy/Kconfig
> index f25702386d83..e9c05848ec52 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/phy/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/net/phy/Kconfig
> @@ -480,8 +480,7 @@ config MICROCHIP_T1_PHY
>  config MICROSEMI_PHY
>  	tristate "Microsemi PHYs"
>  	depends on MACSEC || MACSEC=n
> -	select CRYPTO_AES
> -	select CRYPTO_ECB
> +	select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
>  	help
>  	  Currently supports VSC8514, VSC8530, VSC8531, VSC8540 and VSC8541 PHYs

Shouldn't it be 'select CRYPTO_LIB_AES if MACSEC', since
mscc_macsec.c is only compiled if MACSEC?

>  
> diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_macsec.c b/drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_macsec.c
> index b4d3dc4068e2..d53ca884b5c9 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_macsec.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/phy/mscc/mscc_macsec.c
> @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
>  #include <linux/phy.h>
>  #include <dt-bindings/net/mscc-phy-vsc8531.h>
>  
> -#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/aes.h>
>  
>  #include <net/macsec.h>
>  
> @@ -500,39 +500,17 @@ static u32 vsc8584_macsec_flow_context_id(struct macsec_flow *flow)
>  static int vsc8584_macsec_derive_key(const u8 key[MACSEC_KEYID_LEN],
>  				     u16 key_len, u8 hkey[16])
>  {
> -	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
> -	struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
> -	struct scatterlist src, dst;
> -	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
> -	u32 input[4] = {0};
> +	const u8 input[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] = {0};
> +	struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
>  	int ret;
>  
> -	if (IS_ERR(tfm))
> -		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> -
> -	req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
> -	if (!req) {
> -		ret = -ENOMEM;
> -		goto out;
> -	}
> -
> -	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
> -				      CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, crypto_req_done,
> -				      &wait);
> -	ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
> -	if (ret < 0)
> -		goto out;
> -
> -	sg_init_one(&src, input, 16);
> -	sg_init_one(&dst, hkey, 16);
> -	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, 16, NULL);
> -
> -	ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
> +	ret = aes_expandkey(&ctx, key, key_len);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
>  
> -out:
> -	skcipher_request_free(req);
> -	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
> -	return ret;
> +	aes_encrypt(&ctx, hkey, input);
> +	memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
> +	return 0;
>  }
>  

Otherwise this looks good.  You can add:

	Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>

- Eric