Message-ID: <c016695c-3d22-ac74-5e2f-9210fb5b58af@fb.com>
Date:   Fri, 4 Sep 2020 16:20:40 -0700
From:   Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
To:     Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
CC:     bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Kernel Team <kernel-team@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next 1/2] bpf: permit map_ptr arithmetic with opcode
 add and offset 0



On 9/4/20 1:30 PM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 12:49 PM Yonghong Song <yhs@...com> wrote:
>>
>> Commit 41c48f3a98231 ("bpf: Support access
>> to bpf map fields") added support to access map fields
>> with CORE support. For example,
>>
>>              struct bpf_map {
>>                      __u32 max_entries;
>>              } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
>>
>>              struct bpf_array {
>>                      struct bpf_map map;
>>                      __u32 elem_size;
>>              } __attribute__((preserve_access_index));
>>
>>              struct {
>>                      __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
>>                      __uint(max_entries, 4);
>>                      __type(key, __u32);
>>                      __type(value, __u32);
>>              } m_array SEC(".maps");
>>
>>              SEC("cgroup_skb/egress")
>>              int cg_skb(void *ctx)
>>              {
>>                      struct bpf_array *array = (struct bpf_array *)&m_array;
>>
>>                      /* .. array->map.max_entries .. */
>>              }
>>
>> In kernel, bpf_htab has similar structure,
>>
>>              struct bpf_htab {
>>                      struct bpf_map map;
>>                      ...
>>              }
>>
>> In the above cg_skb(), to access array->map.max_entries, with CORE, the clang will
>> generate two builtin's.
>>              base = &m_array;
>>              /* access array.map */
>>              map_addr = __builtin_preserve_struct_access_info(base, 0, 0);
>>              /* access array.map.max_entries */
>>              max_entries_addr = __builtin_preserve_struct_access_info(map_addr, 0, 0);
>>              max_entries = *max_entries_addr;
>>
>> In the current llvm, if two builtin's are in the same function or
>> in the same function after inlining, the compiler is smart enough to chain
>> them together and generates like below:
>>              base = &m_array;
>>              max_entries = *(base + reloc_offset); /* reloc_offset = 0 in this case */
>> and we are fine.
>>
>> But if we force no inlining for one of functions in test_map_ptr() selftest, e.g.,
>> check_default(), the above two __builtin_preserve_* will be in two different
>> functions. In this case, we will have code like:
>>     func check_hash():
>>              reloc_offset_map = 0;
>>              base = &m_array;
>>              map_base = base + reloc_offset_map;
>>              check_default(map_base, ...)
>>     func check_default(map_base, ...):
>>              max_entries = *(map_base + reloc_offset_max_entries);
>>
>> In kernel, map_ptr (CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) does not allow any arithmetic.
>> The above "map_base = base + reloc_offset_map" will trigger a verifier failure.
>>    ; VERIFY(check_default(&hash->map, map));
>>    0: (18) r7 = 0xffffb4fe8018a004
>>    2: (b4) w1 = 110
>>    3: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +0) = r1
>>     R1_w=invP110 R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=4,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R10=fp0
>>    ; VERIFY_TYPE(BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH, check_hash);
>>    4: (18) r1 = 0xffffb4fe8018a000
>>    6: (b4) w2 = 1
>>    7: (63) *(u32 *)(r1 +0) = r2
>>     R1_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R2_w=invP1 R7_w=map_value(id=0,off=4,ks=4,vs=8,imm=0) R10=fp0
>>    8: (b7) r2 = 0
>>    9: (18) r8 = 0xffff90bcb500c000
>>    11: (18) r1 = 0xffff90bcb500c000
>>    13: (0f) r1 += r2
>>    R1 pointer arithmetic on map_ptr prohibited
>>
>> To fix the issue, let us permit map_ptr + 0 arithmetic which will
>> result in exactly the same map_ptr.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
>> ---
>>   kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 +++
>>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> index b4e9c56b8b32..92aa985e99df 100644
>> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
>> @@ -5317,6 +5317,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>>                          dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
>>                  return -EACCES;
>>          case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
>> +               if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD)
> 
> does smin_val imply that var_off is strictly zero? if that's the case,
> can you please leave a comment stating this clearly, it's hard to tell
> if that's enough of a check.

It should be, if register state is maintained properly, the following 
function (or its functionality) should have been called.

static void __update_reg64_bounds(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
{
         /* min signed is max(sign bit) | min(other bits) */
         reg->smin_value = max_t(s64, reg->smin_value,
                                 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask 
& S64_MIN));
         /* max signed is min(sign bit) | max(other bits) */
         reg->smax_value = min_t(s64, reg->smax_value,
                                 reg->var_off.value | (reg->var_off.mask 
& S64_MAX));
         reg->umin_value = max(reg->umin_value, reg->var_off.value);
         reg->umax_value = min(reg->umax_value,
                               reg->var_off.value | reg->var_off.mask);
}

for scalar constant, reg->var_off.mask should be 0. so we will have
reg->smin_value = reg->smax_value = (s64)reg->var_off.value.

The smin_val is also used below, e.g., BPF_ADD, for a known value.
That is why I am using smin_val here.

Will add a comment and submit v2.

> 
>> +                       break;
>> +               /* fall-through */
>>          case PTR_TO_PACKET_END:
>>          case PTR_TO_SOCKET:
>>          case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL:
>> --
>> 2.24.1
>>

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