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Date:   Wed, 9 Sep 2020 09:32:04 -0700
From:   Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
To:     Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
Cc:     bpf <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, Networking <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Kernel Team <kernel-team@...com>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2] selftests/bpf: fix test_sysctl_loop{1,2}
 failure due to clang change

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 11:40 PM Yonghong Song <yhs@...com> wrote:
>
> Andrii reported that with latest clang, when building selftests, we have
> error likes:
>   error: progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c:23:16: in function sysctl_tcp_mem i32 (%struct.bpf_sysctl*):
>   Looks like the BPF stack limit of 512 bytes is exceeded.
>   Please move large on stack variables into BPF per-cpu array map.
>
> The error is triggered by the following LLVM patch:
>   https://reviews.llvm.org/D87134
>
> For example, the following code is from test_sysctl_loop1.c:
>   static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
>   {
>     volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
>     ...
>   }
> Without the above LLVM patch, the compiler did optimization to load the string
> (59 bytes long) with 7 64bit loads, 1 8bit load and 1 16bit load,
> occupying 64 byte stack size.
>
> With the above LLVM patch, the compiler only uses 8bit loads, but subregister is 32bit.
> So stack requirements become 4 * 59 = 236 bytes. Together with other stuff on
> the stack, total stack size exceeds 512 bytes, hence compiler complains and quits.
>
> To fix the issue, removing "volatile" key word or changing "volatile" to
> "const"/"static const" does not work, the string is put in .rodata.str1.1 section,
> which libbpf did not process it and errors out with
>   libbpf: elf: skipping unrecognized data section(6) .rodata.str1.1
>   libbpf: prog 'sysctl_tcp_mem': bad map relo against '.L__const.is_tcp_mem.tcp_mem_name'
>           in section '.rodata.str1.1'
>
> Defining the string const as global variable can fix the issue as it puts the string constant
> in '.rodata' section which is recognized by libbpf. In the future, when libbpf can process
> '.rodata.str*.*' properly, the global definition can be changed back to local definition.
>
> Defining tcp_mem_name as a global, however, triggered a verifier failure.
>    ./test_progs -n 7/21
>   libbpf: load bpf program failed: Permission denied
>   libbpf: -- BEGIN DUMP LOG ---
>   libbpf:
>   invalid stack off=0 size=1
>   verification time 6975 usec
>   stack depth 160+64
>   processed 889 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 4 total_states
>   14 peak_states 14 mark_read 10
>
>   libbpf: -- END LOG --
>   libbpf: failed to load program 'sysctl_tcp_mem'
>   libbpf: failed to load object 'test_sysctl_loop2.o'
>   test_bpf_verif_scale:FAIL:114
>   #7/21 test_sysctl_loop2.o:FAIL
> This actually exposed a bpf program bug. In test_sysctl_loop{1,2}, we have code
> like
>   const char tcp_mem_name[] = "<...long string...>";
>   ...
>   char name[64];
>   ...
>   for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tcp_mem_name); ++i)
>       if (name[i] != tcp_mem_name[i])
>           return 0;
> In the above code, if sizeof(tcp_mem_name) > 64, name[i] access may be
> out of bound. The sizeof(tcp_mem_name) is 59 for test_sysctl_loop1.c and
> 79 for test_sysctl_loop2.c.
>
> Without promotion-to-global change, old compiler generates code where
> the overflowed stack access is actually filled with valid value, so hiding
> the bpf program bug. With promotion-to-global change, the code is different,
> more specifically, the previous loading constants to stack is gone, and
> "name" occupies stack[-64:0] and overflow access triggers a verifier error.
> To fix the issue, adjust "name" buffer size properly.
>
> Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@...com>
> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
> ---
>  tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c | 2 +-
>  tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c | 5 +++--
>  2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> Changelog:
>   v1 -> v2:
>     . The tcp_mem_name change actually triggers a verifier failure due to
>       a bpf program bug. Fixing the bpf program bug can make test pass
>       with both old and latest llvm. (Alexei)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c
> index 458b0d69133e..4b600b1f522f 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c
> @@ -18,9 +18,9 @@
>  #define MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN 7
>  #define MAX_VALUE_STR_LEN (TCP_MEM_LOOPS * MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN)
>
> +const char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
>  static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
>  {
> -       volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
>         unsigned char i;
>         char name[64];
>         int ret;
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c
> index b2e6f9b0894d..d01056142520 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c
> @@ -18,11 +18,12 @@
>  #define MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN 7
>  #define MAX_VALUE_STR_LEN (TCP_MEM_LOOPS * MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN)
>
> +const char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string_to_stress_byte_loop";
>  static __attribute__((noinline)) int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
>  {
> -       volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string_to_stress_byte_loop";
>         unsigned char i;
> -       char name[64];
> +       /* the above tcp_mem_name length is 79, make name buffer length 80 */
> +       char name[80];


Wow, did you really count? Why not use sizeof(tcp_mem_name) and drop
the comment entirely?

>         int ret;
>
>         memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
> --
> 2.24.1
>

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