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Message-ID: <20210609145115.GL20020@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Wed, 9 Jun 2021 16:51:15 +0200
From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
To: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@...dia.com>
Cc: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@...ux.intel.com>,
Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@...sares.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@...filter.org>,
Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@...filter.org>,
Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>,
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...e.dk>,
Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@...atatu.com>,
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@...nulli.us>,
Patrick McHardy <kaber@...sh.net>,
Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@...hat.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@...le.com>,
Peter Krystad <peter.krystad@...ux.intel.com>,
Young Xiao <92siuyang@...il.com>, netdev@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 1/3] netfilter: synproxy: Fix out of bounds when
parsing TCP options
Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@...dia.com> wrote:
> The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read
> one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets
> into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is
> neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds
> the length of 1.
>
> This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
> out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").
>
> Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@...il.com>
> Fixes: 48b1de4c110a ("netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target")
> Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@...dia.com>
> ---
> net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c
> index b100c04a0e43..621eb5ef9727 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c
> @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ synproxy_parse_options(const struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int doff,
> length--;
> continue;
> default:
> + if (length < 2)
> + return true;
Would you mind a v2 that also rejects bogus th->doff value when
computing the length?
Thanks.
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