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Message-ID: <5bcb1761-14d4-47ed-a8d5-fccf8110d3a1@linux.alibaba.com>
Date:   Fri, 17 Sep 2021 10:15:26 +0800
From:   ηŽ‹θ΄‡ <yun.wang@...ux.alibaba.com>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...hat.com>,
        Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
        Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@...com>,
        Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>, Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>,
        John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
        KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
        "open list:PERFORMANCE EVENTS SUBSYSTEM" 
        <linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:PERFORMANCE EVENTS SUBSYSTEM" 
        <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)" 
        <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:BPF (Safe dynamic programs and tools)" 
        <bpf@...r.kernel.org>, jroedel@...e.de, x86@...nel.org,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/dumpstack/64: Add guard pages to stack_info



On 2021/9/16 δΈ‹εˆ6:02, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 10:03:19AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> 
>> Oh, I'm an idiot... yes it tries to read regs the stack, but clearly
>> that won't work for the guard page.
> 
> OK, extended it to also cover task and IRQ stacks. get_stack_info()
> doesn't seem to know about SOFTIRQ stacks on 64bit, might have to look
> into that next.
> 
> Andy, what's the story with page_fault_oops(), according to the comment
> in exc_double_fault() actual stack overflows will always hit #DF.

Just give this one a test, still not working properly...

[   51.016033][    C0] traps: PANIC: double fault, error_code: 0x0
[   51.016047][    C0] double fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   51.016054][    C0] CPU: 0 PID: 761 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.14.0-next-20210913+ #543
[   51.016061][    C0] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
[   51.016065][    C0] RIP: 0010:perf_swevent_get_recursion_context+0x0/0x70
[   51.016079][    C0] Code: 48 03 43 28 48 8b 0c 24 bb 01 00 00 00 4c 29 f0 48 39 c8 48 0f 47 c1 49 89 45 08 e9 48 ff ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <55> 53 e8 09 20 f2 ff 48 c7 c2 20 4d 03 00 65 48 03 15 5a 3b d2 7e
[   51.016086][    C0] RSP: 0018:fffffe000000b000 EFLAGS: 00010046
[   51.016093][    C0] RAX: 0000000080120008 RBX: fffffe000000b050 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   51.016097][    C0] RDX: ffff888106c3c300 RSI: ffffffff81269031 RDI: 000000000000001c
[   51.016102][    C0] RBP: 000000000000001c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   51.016106][    C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[   51.016109][    C0] R13: fffffe000000b044 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
[   51.016113][    C0] FS:  00007f0cfd961740(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   51.016120][    C0] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   51.016124][    C0] CR2: fffffe000000aff8 CR3: 0000000105ecc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[   51.016129][    C0] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   51.016132][    C0] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   51.016136][    C0] Call Trace:
[   51.016139][    C0]  <TASK>
[   51.016141][    C0]  </TASK>
[   51.016144][    C0] Modules linked in:
[   51.042436][    C0] ---[ end trace 5c102ce76b073dcf ]---
[   51.042440][    C0] RIP: 0010:perf_swevent_get_recursion_context+0x0/0x70
[   51.042450][    C0] Code: 48 03 43 28 48 8b 0c 24 bb 01 00 00 00 4c 29 f0 48 39 c8 48 0f 47 c1 49 89 45 08 e9 48 ff ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <55> 53 e8 09 20 f2 ff 48 c7 c2 20 4d 03 00 65 48 03 15 5a 3b d2 7e
[   51.042457][    C0] RSP: 0018:fffffe000000b000 EFLAGS: 00010046
[   51.042462][    C0] RAX: 0000000080120008 RBX: fffffe000000b050 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   51.042466][    C0] RDX: ffff888106c3c300 RSI: ffffffff81269031 RDI: 000000000000001c
[   51.042470][    C0] RBP: 000000000000001c R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   51.042479][    C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[   51.042483][    C0] R13: fffffe000000b044 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
[   51.042487][    C0] FS:  00007f0cfd961740(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   51.042493][    C0] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   51.042497][    C0] CR2: fffffe000000aff8 CR3: 0000000105ecc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[   51.042501][    C0] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   51.042505][    C0] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   51.042510][    C0] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[   51.042917][    C0] Kernel Offset: disabled

Regards,
Michael Wang


> 
> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
> index 3d52b094850a..c4e92462c2b4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
> @@ -61,6 +61,9 @@ enum exception_stack_ordering {
>  #define CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st)					\
>  	offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, st## _stack)
>  
> +#define CEA_EGUARD_OFFS(st)					\
> +	offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, st## _stack_guard)
> +
>  #define CEA_ESTACK_PAGES					\
>  	(sizeof(struct cea_exception_stacks) / PAGE_SIZE)
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
> index f248eb2ac2d4..8ff346579330 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/stacktrace.h
> @@ -14,13 +14,14 @@
>  #include <asm/switch_to.h>
>  
>  enum stack_type {
> -	STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN,
> +	STACK_TYPE_UNKNOWN = 0,
>  	STACK_TYPE_TASK,
>  	STACK_TYPE_IRQ,
>  	STACK_TYPE_SOFTIRQ,
>  	STACK_TYPE_ENTRY,
>  	STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION,
>  	STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST = STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + N_EXCEPTION_STACKS-1,
> +	STACK_TYPE_GUARD = 0x80,
>  };
>  
>  struct stack_info {
> @@ -31,6 +32,15 @@ struct stack_info {
>  bool in_task_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
>  		   struct stack_info *info);
>  
> +static __always_inline bool in_stack_guard(void *addr, void *begin, void *end)
> +{
> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
> +	if (addr > (begin - PAGE_SIZE))
> +		return true;
> +#endif
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>  bool in_entry_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info);
>  
>  int get_stack_info(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> index ea4fe192189d..91b406fe2a39 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
> @@ -32,12 +32,19 @@ static struct pt_regs exec_summary_regs;
>  bool noinstr in_task_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
>  			   struct stack_info *info)
>  {
> -	unsigned long *begin = task_stack_page(task);
> -	unsigned long *end   = task_stack_page(task) + THREAD_SIZE;
> -
> -	if (stack < begin || stack >= end)
> +	void *begin = task_stack_page(task);
> +	void *end   = begin + THREAD_SIZE;
> +	int type    = STACK_TYPE_TASK;
> +
> +	if ((void *)stack < begin || (void *)stack >= end) {
> +		if (in_stack_guard(stack, begin, end)) {
> +			type |= STACK_TYPE_GUARD;
> +			goto fill_info;
> +		}
>  		return false;
> +	}
>  
> +fill_info:
>  	info->type	= STACK_TYPE_TASK;
>  	info->begin	= begin;
>  	info->end	= end;
> @@ -50,14 +57,20 @@ bool noinstr in_task_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
>  bool noinstr in_entry_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
>  {
>  	struct entry_stack *ss = cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id());
> -
> +	int type = STACK_TYPE_ENTRY;
>  	void *begin = ss;
>  	void *end = ss + 1;
>  
> -	if ((void *)stack < begin || (void *)stack >= end)
> +	if ((void *)stack < begin || (void *)stack >= end) {
> +		if (in_stack_guard(stack, begin, end)) {
> +			type |= STACK_TYPE_GUARD;
> +			goto fill_info;
> +		}
>  		return false;
> +	}
>  
> -	info->type	= STACK_TYPE_ENTRY;
> +fill_info:
> +	info->type	= type;
>  	info->begin	= begin;
>  	info->end	= end;
>  	info->next_sp	= NULL;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> index 5601b95944fa..3634bdf9ab36 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c
> @@ -32,9 +32,15 @@ const char *stack_type_name(enum stack_type type)
>  {
>  	BUILD_BUG_ON(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS != 6);
>  
> +	if (type == STACK_TYPE_TASK)
> +		return "TASK";
> +
>  	if (type == STACK_TYPE_IRQ)
>  		return "IRQ";
>  
> +	if (type == STACK_TYPE_SOFTIRQ)
> +		return "SOFTIRQ";
> +
>  	if (type == STACK_TYPE_ENTRY) {
>  		/*
>  		 * On 64-bit, we have a generic entry stack that we
> @@ -63,6 +69,11 @@ struct estack_pages {
>  };
>  
>  #define EPAGERANGE(st)							\
> +	[PFN_DOWN(CEA_EGUARD_OFFS(st))] = {				\
> +		.offs	= CEA_EGUARD_OFFS(st),				\
> +		.size	= PAGE_SIZE,					\
> +		.type	= STACK_TYPE_GUARD +				\
> +			  STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + ESTACK_ ##st, },	\
>  	[PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st)) ...				\
>  	 PFN_DOWN(CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st) + CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st) - 1)] = {	\
>  		.offs	= CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st),				\
> @@ -111,7 +122,7 @@ static __always_inline bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stac
>  	k = (stk - begin) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>  	/* Lookup the page descriptor */
>  	ep = &estack_pages[k];
> -	/* Guard page? */
> +	/* unknown entry */
>  	if (!ep->size)
>  		return false;
>  
> @@ -122,7 +133,12 @@ static __always_inline bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stac
>  	info->type	= ep->type;
>  	info->begin	= (unsigned long *)begin;
>  	info->end	= (unsigned long *)end;
> -	info->next_sp	= (unsigned long *)regs->sp;
> +	info->next_sp	= NULL;
> +
> +	/* Can't read regs from a guard page. */
> +	if (!(ep->type & STACK_TYPE_GUARD))
> +		info->next_sp = (unsigned long *)regs->sp;
> +
>  	return true;
>  }
>  
> @@ -130,6 +146,7 @@ static __always_inline bool in_irq_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info
>  {
>  	unsigned long *end = (unsigned long *)this_cpu_read(hardirq_stack_ptr);
>  	unsigned long *begin;
> +	int type = STACK_TYPE_IRQ;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * @end points directly to the top most stack entry to avoid a -8
> @@ -144,19 +161,27 @@ static __always_inline bool in_irq_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info
>  	 * final operation is 'popq %rsp' which means after that RSP points
>  	 * to the original stack and not to @end.
>  	 */
> -	if (stack < begin || stack >= end)
> +	if (stack < begin || stack >= end) {
> +		if (in_stack_guard(stack, begin, end)) {
> +			type |= STACK_TYPE_GUARD;
> +			goto fill_info;
> +		}
>  		return false;
> +	}
>  
> -	info->type	= STACK_TYPE_IRQ;
> +fill_info:
> +	info->type	= type;
>  	info->begin	= begin;
>  	info->end	= end;
> +	info->next_sp	= NULL;
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * The next stack pointer is stored at the top of the irq stack
>  	 * before switching to the irq stack. Actual stack entries are all
>  	 * below that.
>  	 */
> -	info->next_sp = (unsigned long *)*(end - 1);
> +	if (!(type & STACK_TYPE_GUARD))
> +		info->next_sp = (unsigned long *)*(end - 1);
>  
>  	return true;
>  }
> @@ -193,6 +218,9 @@ int get_stack_info(unsigned long *stack, struct task_struct *task,
>  	if (!get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, task, info))
>  		goto unknown;
>  
> +	if (info->type & STACK_TYPE_GUARD)
> +		goto unknown;
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * Make sure we don't iterate through any given stack more than once.
>  	 * If it comes up a second time then there's something wrong going on:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> index a58800973aed..80f6d8d735eb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
> @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_DF(exc_double_fault)
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>  	unsigned long address = read_cr2();
> +	struct stack_info info;
>  #endif
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
> @@ -455,9 +456,11 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_DF(exc_double_fault)
>  	 * stack even if the actual trigger for the double fault was
>  	 * something else.
>  	 */
> -	if ((unsigned long)task_stack_page(tsk) - 1 - address < PAGE_SIZE) {
> -		handle_stack_overflow("kernel stack overflow (double-fault)",
> -				      regs, address);
> +	if (get_stack_info_noinstr((void *)address, current, &info) &&
> +	    info.type & STACK_TYPE_GUARD) {
> +		const char *name = stack_type_name(info.type & ~STACK_TYPE_GUARD);
> +		pr_emerg("BUG: %s stack guard hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n",
> +			 name, (void *)address, info.begin, info.end);
>  	}
>  #endif
>  
> @@ -708,7 +711,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *r
>  	sp    = regs->sp;
>  	stack = (unsigned long *)sp;
>  
> -	if (!get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info) || info.type == STACK_TYPE_ENTRY ||
> +	if (!get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info) ||
> +	    info.type & STACK_TYPE_GUARD ||
> +	    info.type == STACK_TYPE_ENTRY ||
>  	    info.type >= STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST)
>  		sp = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC2);
>  
> 

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