lists.openwall.net   lists  /  announce  owl-users  owl-dev  john-users  john-dev  passwdqc-users  yescrypt  popa3d-users  /  oss-security  kernel-hardening  musl  sabotage  tlsify  passwords  /  crypt-dev  xvendor  /  Bugtraq  Full-Disclosure  linux-kernel  linux-netdev  linux-ext4  linux-hardening  linux-cve-announce  PHC 
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
 
Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date:   Thu, 2 Dec 2021 09:31:10 -0800
From:   Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To:     Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@...dia.com>
Cc:     Sunil Sudhakar Rani <sunrani@...dia.com>,
        Parav Pandit <parav@...dia.com>, Jiri Pirko <jiri@...dia.com>,
        "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Bodong Wang <bodong@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2] devlink: Add support to set port function
 as trusted

On Wed, 1 Dec 2021 07:07:05 +0000 Saeed Mahameed wrote:
> On Tue, 2021-11-30 at 19:12 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> > On Tue, 30 Nov 2021 22:17:29 +0000 Sunil Sudhakar Rani wrote:  
> > > Sorry for the late response. We agree that the current definition
> > > is vague.
> > > 
> > > What we meant is that the enforcement is done by device/FW.
> > > We simply want to allow VF/SF to access privileged or restricted
> > > resource such as physical port counters.
> > > So how about defining the api such that:
> > > This knob allows the VF/SF to access restricted resource such as
> > > physical port counters.  
> > 
> > You need to say more about the use case, I don't understand 
> > what you're doing.  
> 
> Some device features/registers/units are not available by default to
> VFs/SFs (e.g restricted), examples are: physical port
> registers/counters and similar global attributes.
> 
> Some customers want to use SF/VF in specialized VM/container for
> management and monitoring, thus they want SF/VF to have similar
> privileges to PF in terms of access to restricted resources.
> 
> Note: this doesn't break the sriov/sf model, trusted SF/VF will not be
> allowed to alter device attributes, they will simply enjoy access to
> more resources/features.

None of this explains the use case. It's pretty much what Sunil already
stated. 

> We would've pushed for a more fine-grained per "capability" API, but
> where do we start/end? I think "trust" concept is the right approach.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Powered by Openwall GNU/*/Linux Powered by OpenVZ