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Message-ID: <5c4b51aecd1c5100bffdfab03bc76ef380c9799d.camel@nvidia.com>
Date:   Wed, 1 Dec 2021 07:07:05 +0000
From:   Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@...dia.com>
To:     "kuba@...nel.org" <kuba@...nel.org>,
        Sunil Sudhakar Rani <sunrani@...dia.com>
CC:     Parav Pandit <parav@...dia.com>, Jiri Pirko <jiri@...dia.com>,
        "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Bodong Wang <bodong@...dia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2] devlink: Add support to set port function as
 trusted

On Tue, 2021-11-30 at 19:12 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Tue, 30 Nov 2021 22:17:29 +0000 Sunil Sudhakar Rani wrote:
> > > On Mon, 22 Nov 2021 16:43:06 +0200 Sunil Rani wrote:  
> > > > The device/firmware decides how to define privileges and access
> > > > to resources.
> > > 
> > > Great API definition. Nack  
> > 
> > Sorry for the late response. We agree that the current definition
> > is vague.
> > 
> > What we meant is that the enforcement is done by device/FW.
> > We simply want to allow VF/SF to access privileged or restricted
> > resource such as physical port counters.
> > So how about defining the api such that:
> > This knob allows the VF/SF to access restricted resource such as
> > physical port counters.
> 
> You need to say more about the use case, I don't understand 
> what you're doing.

Some device features/registers/units are not available by default to
VFs/SFs (e.g restricted), examples are: physical port
registers/counters and similar global attributes.

Some customers want to use SF/VF in specialized VM/container for
management and monitoring, thus they want SF/VF to have similar
privileges to PF in terms of access to restricted resources.

Note: this doesn't break the sriov/sf model, trusted SF/VF will not be
allowed to alter device attributes, they will simply enjoy access to
more resources/features.

We would've pushed for a more fine-grained per "capability" API, but
where do we start/end? I think "trust" concept is the right approach.

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