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Date: Thu, 13 Jan 2022 13:29:39 +0100 From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org> To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@...essinduktion.org>, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>, "open list:BPF JIT for MIPS (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@...il.com>, Linux Crypto Mailing List <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, Erik Kline <ek@...gle.com>, Fernando Gont <fgont@...networks.com>, Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@...gle.com>, hideaki.yoshifuji@...aclelinux.com Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v1 2/3] ipv6: move from sha1 to blake2s in address calculation On Thu, 13 Jan 2022 at 13:22, Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@...c4.com> wrote: > > On 1/13/22, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org> wrote: > > > > The question is not whether but when we can/will change this. > > > > SHA-1 is broken and should be removed at *some* point, so unless the > > feature itself is going to be obsolete, its implementation will need > > to switch to a PRF that fulfils the requirements in RFC7217 once SHA-1 > > ceases to do so. > > > > And I should also point out that the current implementation does not > > even use SHA-1 correctly, as it omits the finalization step. This may > > or may not matter in practice, but it deviates from crypto best > > practices, as well as from RFC7217 > > > > I already pointed out to Jason (in private) that the PRF does not need > > to be based on a cryptographic hash, so as far as I can tell, siphash > > would be a suitable candidate here as well, and I already switched the > > TCP fastopen code to that in the past. But SHA-1 definitely has to go. > > > > Correction: this should be a cryptographically secure. Of course. I said it does not need to be based on a cryptographic *hash*. > That's part of > the point of moving away from SHA-1 of course. But fortunately, > siphash *is* > considered to be cryptographically secure. Whether you want blake2s's > keyed mode or siphash doesn't really matter to me. I thought the > former's API mapped a bit neater here. Fair enough. This is not on a hot path anyway, so it doesn't really matter performance wise.
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