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Message-ID: <d09ac689-b1bf-86fa-4da5-3a0ade7fd552@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 13:17:27 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
netfilter@...r.kernel.org, yusongping@...wei.com,
artem.kuzin@...wei.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] landlock: selftests for bind and connect hooks
On 08/02/2022 04:01, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>
>
> 2/7/2022 3:49 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>> [...]
>>
>>>>> + /* Create a socket 3 */
>>>>> + sockfd_3 = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
>>>>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_3);
>>>>> + /* Allow reuse of local addresses */
>>>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
>>>>> &one, sizeof(one)));
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* Set socket 3 address parameters */
>>>>> + addr_3.sin_family = AF_INET;
>>>>> + addr_3.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT_3);
>>>>> + addr_3.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
>>>>> + memset(&(addr_3.sin_zero), '\0', 8);
>>>>> + /* Bind the socket 3 to IP address */
>>>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_3, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_3,
>>>>> sizeof(addr_3)));
>>>>
>>>> Why is it allowed to bind to SOCK_PORT_3 whereas net_service_3
>>>> forbids it?
>>>
>>> It's allowed cause net_service_3 has empty access field.
>>>
>>> /* Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in network
>>> * actions for SOCK_PORT_3 socket "object"
>>> */
>>> ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>>> LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>>> &net_service_3, 0));
>>> ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
>>>
>>> Applying this rule returns ENOMSG errno:
>>>
>>> /* Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
>>> * are ignored in network actions
>>> */
>>> if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access) {
>>> err = -ENOMSG;
>>> goto out_put_ruleset;
>>> }
>>> This means binding socket 3 is not restricted.
>>> For path_beneath_attr.allowed_access = 0 there is the same logic.
>>
>> I missed the ENOMSG check; the third rule has nothing to do with it.
>> However, because the ruleset handles bind and connect actions, they
>> must be denied by default. There is no rule allowing binding to
>> SOCK_PORT_3. Why is it allowed?
>>
>> You can test with another SOCK_PORT_4, not covered by any rule. As for
>> SOCK_PORT_3, it must be forbidden to bind on it.
>
> Apllying the third rule (net_service_3.access is empty) returns ENOMSG
> error. That means a process hasn't been restricted by the third rule,
> cause during search process in network rb_tree the process won't find
> the third rule, so binding to SOCK_PORT_3 is allowed.
Landlock is designed to deny every access rights that are handled (by a
ruleset) by default. All rules added to a ruleset are exceptions to
allow a subset of the handled access rights on a specific object/port.
With the current networking code, a sandboxed process can still bind or
connect to any port except, in this test, partially for two ports. This
approach doesn't help to isolate a process from the network.
>
> Maybe there is a misunderstanding here. You mean that if there is just
> only one network rule for a particular port has been applied to a
> process, other ports' networks actions are automatically restricted
> until they will be added into landlock newtwork rb_tree?
Right! That is how it should be.
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