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Message-ID: <20220309134459.6448-15-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 21:44:58 +0800
From: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
To: <mic@...ikod.net>
CC: <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
<netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <yusongping@...wei.com>,
<artem.kuzin@...wei.com>, <anton.sirazetdinov@...wei.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 14/15] seltest/landlock: ruleset expanding test
This patch adds expanding rulesets in which
rules are gradually added one by one, restricting
sockets' connections.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
---
Changes since v3:
* Add ruleset_expanding test.
---
.../testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 153 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c
index e1f219fd9f31..8fa2a349329c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/network_test.c
@@ -457,4 +457,157 @@ TEST_F_FORK(socket, ruleset_overlap) {
ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
}
+TEST_F_FORK(socket, ruleset_expanding) {
+
+ int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_1 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = port[0],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr_1,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr_1), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1 */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket(_metadata);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr[0], sizeof(addr[0])));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr[0],
+ sizeof(addr[0])));
+
+ /* Closes socket 1 */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 2 */
+ sockfd_2 = create_socket(_metadata);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+ * cause there is no rule with bind() access for port[1].
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind(sockfd_2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr[1], sizeof(addr[1])));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Expands network mask */
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_2 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ /* Adds connect() access to port[0] */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = port[0],
+ };
+ /* Adds bind() access to port[1] */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = port[1],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr_2,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr_2), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+ /* Adds rule to port[1] socket */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_3, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_2));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1 */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket(_metadata);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr[0], sizeof(addr[0])));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr[0],
+ sizeof(addr[0])));
+ /* Closes socket 1 */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 2 */
+ sockfd_2 = create_socket(_metadata);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+ * cause just one layer has bind() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind(sockfd_2, (struct sockaddr *)&addr[1], sizeof(addr[1])));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Expands network mask */
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_3 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ /* Restricts connect() access to port[0] */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = port[0],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_3 = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr_3,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr_3), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_3);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_3, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_4, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_3);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_3));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1 */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket(_metadata);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0] */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr[0], sizeof(addr[0])));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 1 to address with port[0],
+ * cause just one layer has connect() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect(sockfd_1, (struct sockaddr *)&addr[0],
+ sizeof(addr[0])));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Closes socket 1 */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.25.1
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