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Message-ID: <20230125150836.590fae7a@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 15:08:36 -0800
From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
To: Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>
Cc: Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@...zon.com>, sd@...asysnail.net,
borisp@...dia.com, dueno@...hat.com, fkrenzel@...hat.com,
gal@...dia.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, tariqt@...dia.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3
On Wed, 25 Jan 2023 18:05:38 -0500 Simo Sorce wrote:
> > > If it is not guaranteed, are you blocking use of AES GCM and any other
> > > block cipher that may have very bad failure modes in a situation like
> > > this (in the case of AES GCM I am thinking of IV reuse) ?
> >
> > I don't know what you mean.
>
> The question was if there is *any* case where re-transmission can cause
> different data to be encrypted with the same key + same IV
Not in valid use cases. With zero-copy / sendfile Tx technically
the page from the page cache can change between tx and rtx, but
the user needs to opt in explicitly acknowledging the application
will prevent this from happening. If they don't opt-in we'll copy
the data.
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