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Message-ID: <b610a041864cf696a686ba00910c252713ace0fe.camel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 18:52:49 -0500
From: Simo Sorce <simo@...hat.com>
To: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>
Cc: Apoorv Kothari <apoorvko@...zon.com>, sd@...asysnail.net,
borisp@...dia.com, dueno@...hat.com, fkrenzel@...hat.com,
gal@...dia.com, netdev@...r.kernel.org, tariqt@...dia.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 0/5] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3
On Wed, 2023-01-25 at 15:08 -0800, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Wed, 25 Jan 2023 18:05:38 -0500 Simo Sorce wrote:
> > > > If it is not guaranteed, are you blocking use of AES GCM and any other
> > > > block cipher that may have very bad failure modes in a situation like
> > > > this (in the case of AES GCM I am thinking of IV reuse) ?
> > >
> > > I don't know what you mean.
> >
> > The question was if there is *any* case where re-transmission can cause
> > different data to be encrypted with the same key + same IV
>
> Not in valid use cases. With zero-copy / sendfile Tx technically
> the page from the page cache can change between tx and rtx, but
> the user needs to opt in explicitly acknowledging the application
> will prevent this from happening. If they don't opt-in we'll copy
> the data.
Uhmm is there a way to detect this happening and abort further crypto
operations in case it happens ?
Simo.
--
Simo Sorce
RHEL Crypto Team
Red Hat, Inc
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