Date:   Tue, 14 Feb 2023 07:45:48 +0000
From:   "Michael Kelley (LINUX)" <mikelley@...rosoft.com>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
CC:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "hpa@...or.com" <hpa@...or.com>, KY Srinivasan <kys@...rosoft.com>,
        Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@...rosoft.com>,
        "wei.liu@...nel.org" <wei.liu@...nel.org>,
        Dexuan Cui <decui@...rosoft.com>,
        "luto@...nel.org" <luto@...nel.org>,
        "peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
        "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "edumazet@...gle.com" <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        "kuba@...nel.org" <kuba@...nel.org>,
        "pabeni@...hat.com" <pabeni@...hat.com>,
        "lpieralisi@...nel.org" <lpieralisi@...nel.org>,
        "robh@...nel.org" <robh@...nel.org>, "kw@...ux.com" <kw@...ux.com>,
        "bhelgaas@...gle.com" <bhelgaas@...gle.com>,
        "arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>, "hch@....de" <hch@....de>,
        "m.szyprowski@...sung.com" <m.szyprowski@...sung.com>,
        "robin.murphy@....com" <robin.murphy@....com>,
        "thomas.lendacky@....com" <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
        "brijesh.singh@....com" <brijesh.singh@....com>,
        "tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
        "dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@...rosoft.com>,
        "kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        "sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com" 
        <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@...ux.intel.com>,
        "ak@...ux.intel.com" <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        "isaku.yamahata@...el.com" <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>,
        "dan.j.williams@...el.com" <dan.j.williams@...el.com>,
        "jane.chu@...cle.com" <jane.chu@...cle.com>,
        "tony.luck@...el.com" <tony.luck@...el.com>,
        "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@...r.kernel.org>,
        "netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-pci@...r.kernel.org" <linux-pci@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        "iommu@...ts.linux.dev" <iommu@...ts.linux.dev>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range
 to map as encrypted

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 3:47 PM
> 
> On Fri, Feb 10, 2023, Michael Kelley (LINUX) wrote:
> > From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023
> 12:58 PM
> > >
> > > On Fri, Feb 10, 2023, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Feb 10, 2023, Dave Hansen wrote:
> > > > > On 2/10/23 11:36, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> > > > > >> One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now.>> If the list
> > > does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns
> > > > > >> or groupings that we can't discern now.  We could restructure into
> > > > > >> larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.
> > > > > > There's a reason the word "platform" is in cc_platform_has(). Initially
> > > > > > we wanted to distinguish attributes of the different platforms. So even
> > > > > > if y'all don't like CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR, that is what distinguishes this
> > > > > > platform and it *is* one platform.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So call it CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM as it uses that technology or whatever. But
> > > > > > call it like the platform, not to mean "I need this functionality".
> > > > >
> > > > > I can live with that.  There's already a CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP, so it
> > > > > would at least not be too much of a break from what we already have.
> > > >
> > > > I'm fine with CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM, assuming the proposal is to have something
> like:
> > > >
> > > > 	static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr)
> > > > 	{
> > > > 		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM))
> > > > 			return is_address_below_vtom(addr);
> > > >
> > > > 		return false;
> > > > 	}
> > > >
> > > > i.e. not have SEV_VTOM mean "I/O APIC and vTPM are private".  Though I don't
> see
> > > > the point in making it SEV vTOM specific or using a flag.  Despite what any of us
> > > > think about TDX paravisors, it's completely doable within the confines of TDX to
> > > > have an emulated device reside in the private address space.  E.g. why not
> > > > something like this?
> > > >
> > > > 	static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr)
> > > > 	{
> > > > 		return addr < cc_platform_private_end;
> > > > 	}
> > > >
> > > > where SEV fills in "cc_platform_private_end" when vTOM is enabled, and TDX does
> > > > the same.  Or wrap cc_platform_private_end in a helper, etc.
> > >
> > > Gah, forgot that the intent with TDX is to enumerate devices in their legacy
> > > address spaces.  So a TDX guest couldn't do this by default, but if/when Hyper-V
> > > or some other hypervisor moves I/O APIC, vTPM, etc... into the TCB, the common
> > > code would just work and only the hypervisor-specific paravirt code would need
> > > to change.
> > >
> > > Probably need a more specific name than is_address_range_private() though, e.g.
> > > is_mmio_address_range_private()?
> >
> > Maybe I'm not understanding what you are proposing, but in an SEV-SNP
> > VM using vTOM, devices like the IO-APIC and TPM live at their usual guest
> > physical addresses.
> 
> Ah, so as the cover letter says, the intent really is to treat vTOM as an
> attribute bit.  Sorry, I got confused by Boris's comment:
> 
>   : What happens if the next silly HV guest scheme comes along and they do
>   : need more and different ones?
> 
> Based on that comment, I assumed the proposal to use CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM was
> intended
> to be a generic range-based thing, but it sounds like that's not the case.
> 
> IMO, using CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM to infer anything about the state of I/O APIC or vTPM
> is wrong.  vTOM as a platform feature effectively says "physical address bit X
> controls private vs. shared" (ignoring weird usage of vTOM).  vTOM does not mean
> I/O APIC and vTPM are private, that's very much a property of Hyper-V's current
> generation of vTOM-based VMs.
> 
> Hardcoding this in the guest feels wrong.  Ideally, we would have a way to enumerate
> that a device is private/trusted, e.g. through ACPI.  I'm guessing we already
> missed the boat on that, so the next best thing is to do something like Michael
> originally proposed in this patch and shove the "which devices are private" logic
> into hypervisor-specific code, i.e. let Hyper-V figure out how to enumerate to its
> guests which devices are shared.
> 
> I agree with Boris' comment that a one-off "other encrypted range" is a hack, but
> that's just an API problem.  The kernel already has hypervisor specific hooks (and
> for SEV-ES even), why not expand that?  That way figuring out which devices are
> private is wholly contained in Hyper-V code, at least until there's a generic
> solution for enumerating private devices, though that seems unlikely to happen
> and will be a happy problem to solve if it does come about.

Yes, this is definitely a cleaner way to implement what I was originally proposing.
I can make it work if there's agreement to take this approach.

Michael 

> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
> index a868b76cd3d4..08f65ed439d9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c
> @@ -2682,11 +2682,16 @@ static void io_apic_set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx,
> phys_addr_t phys)
>  {
>         pgprot_t flags = FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE;
> 
> -       /*
> -        * Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot
> -        * bits, just like normal ioremap():
> -        */
> -       flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
> +       if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
> +               /*
> +               * Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot
> +               * bits, just like normal ioremap():
> +               */
> +               if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio(phys))
> +                       flags = pgprot_encrypted(flags);
> +               else
> +                       flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
> +       }
> 
>         __set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags);
>  }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> index 6453fbaedb08..0baec766b921 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
> @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct
> ioremap_desc *des
>         if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>                 return;
> 
> +       if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio(addr))
> +               desc->flags |= IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED;
> +
>         if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI))
>                 return;
> 

Powered by blists - more mailing lists