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Message-ID: <Y+4wiyepKU8IEr48@zn.tnic>
Date:   Thu, 16 Feb 2023 14:32:59 +0100
From:   Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To:     Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc:     "Michael Kelley (LINUX)" <mikelley@...rosoft.com>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range
 to map as encrypted

On Fri, Feb 10, 2023 at 11:47:27PM +0000, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> I agree with Boris' comment that a one-off "other encrypted range" is a hack, but
> that's just an API problem.  The kernel already has hypervisor specific hooks (and
> for SEV-ES even), why not expand that?  That way figuring out which devices are
> private is wholly contained in Hyper-V code, at least until there's a generic
> solution for enumerating private devices, though that seems unlikely to happen
> and will be a happy problem to solve if it does come about.

I feel ya and this all makes sense and your proposals look clean enough
to me but we still need some way of determining whether this is a vTOM
on hyperv because there's the next crapola with

https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230209072220.6836-4-jgross@suse.com

because apparently hyperv does PAT but disables MTRRs for such vTOM
SEV-SNP guests and ... madness.

But that's not the only example - Xen has been doing this thing too.

And Jürgen has been trying to address this in a clean way but it is
a pain.

What I don't want to have is a gazillion ways to check what needs to
happen for which guest type. Because people who change the kernel to run
on baremetal, will break them. And I can't blame them. We try to support
all kinds of guests in the x86 code but this support should be plain and
simple.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

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