netdev - Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] vsprintf: Warn on integer scanning overflows

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2023 17:27:50 +0300
From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>
To: Richard Weinberger <richard@....at>
Cc: linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, keescook@...omium.org,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
	Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@...omium.org>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <linux@...musvillemoes.dk>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
	Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@...nel.org>,
	Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor@...il.com>,
	Wedson Almeida Filho <wedsonaf@...il.com>,
	Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>, Gary Guo <gary@...yguo.net>,
	Björn Roy Baron <bjorn3_gh@...tonmail.com>,
	Benno Lossin <benno.lossin@...ton.me>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@...nel.org>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] vsprintf: Warn on integer scanning overflows

On Thu, Jun 08, 2023 at 12:37:55AM +0200, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> The scanf function family has no way to indicate overflows
> while scanning. As consequence users of these function have to make
> sure their input cannot cause an overflow.
> Since this is not always the case add WARN_ON_ONCE() guards to
> trigger a warning upon an overflow.

...

>  	if (prefix_chars < max_chars) {
>  		rv = _parse_integer_limit(cp, base, &result, max_chars - prefix_chars);
> +		WARN_ON_ONCE(rv & KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW);

This seems incorrect. simple_strto*() are okay to overflow. It's by design.

>  		/* FIXME */

...and that's why this one is here.

>  		cp += (rv & ~KSTRTOX_OVERFLOW);
>  	} else {


-- 
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko