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Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 15:49:40 +0200
From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@...il.com>, Stephen Hemminger
 <stephen@...workplumber.org>, netdev@...r.kernel.org, Nicolas Dichtel
 <nicolas.dichtel@...nd.com>, Christian Brauner <brauner@...nel.org>, David
 Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH iproute2-next 0/5] Persisting of mount namespaces
 along with network namespaces

"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com> writes:

> Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com> writes:
>
>> "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com> writes:
>>
>>> Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com> writes:
>>>
>>> There are not many places to look so something like this is probably sufficient:
>>>
>>> # stat all of the possible/probable mount points and see if there is
>>> # something mounted there.  If so recursive bind whatever is there onto
>>> # the new /sys
>>>
>>> for dir in /old/sys/fs/* /old/sys/kernel/*; do
>>> 	if [ $(stat --format '%d' "$dir") = $(stat --format '%d' "$dir/") ; then
>>
>> What is this comparison supposed to do? I couldn't find any directories
>> in /sys/fs/* where this was *not* true, regardless of whether there's a
>> mount there or not.
>
> Bah.  I think I got my logic scrambled.  I can only get it to work
> by comparing the filesystems device on /sys/fs to the device on
> /sys/fs/cgroup etc.
>
> The idea is that st_dev changes between filesystems.  So you can detect
> a filesystem change based on st_dev.
>
> I thought the $dir vs $dir/ would have allowed stating the underlying
> directory verses the mount, but apparently my memory go that one wrong.
>
> Which makes my command actually something like:
>
> 	sys_dev=$(stat --format='%d' /sys)
>
> 	for dir in /old/sys/fs/* /old/sys/kernel/*; do
> 		if [ $(stat --format '%d' "$dir") -ne $sys_dev ] ; then
>                 	echo $dir is a mount point
>                 fi
> 	done

Ah, right that makes sense! I thought I was missing something when I
couldn't get your other example to work...

>>>>> Or is their a reason that bpffs should be per network namespace?
>>>>
>>>> Well, I first ran into this issue because of a bug report to
>>>> xdp-tools/libxdp about things not working correctly in network
>>>> namespaces:
>>>>
>>>> https://github.com/xdp-project/xdp-tools/issues/364
>>>>
>>>> And libxdp does assume that there's a separate bpffs per network
>>>> namespace: it persists things into the bpffs that is tied to the network
>>>> devices in the current namespace. So if the bpffs is shared, an
>>>> application running inside the network namespace could access XDP
>>>> programs loaded in the root namespace. I don't know, but suspect, that
>>>> such assumptions would be relatively common in networking BPF programs
>>>> that use pinning (the pinning support in libbpf and iproute2 itself at
>>>> least have the same leaking problem if the bpffs is shared).
>>>
>>> Are the names of the values truly network namespace specific?
>>>
>>> I did not see any mention of the things that are persisted in the ticket
>>> you pointed me at, and unfortunately I am not familiar with xdp.
>>>
>>> Last I looked until all of the cpu side channels are closed it is
>>> unfortunately unsafe to load ebpf programs with anything less than
>>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN (aka with permission to see and administer the entire
>>> system).  So from a system point of view I really don't see a
>>> fundamental danger from having a global /sys/fs/bpf.
>>>
>>> If there are name conflicts in /sys/fs/bpf because of duplicate names in
>>> different network namespaces I can see that being a problem.
>>
>> Yeah, you're right that someone loading a BPF program generally has
>> permissions enough that they can break out of any containment if they
>> want, but applications do make assumptions about the contents of the
>> pinning directory that can lead to conflicts.
>>
>> A couple of examples:
>>
>> - libxdp will persist files in /sys/fs/bpf/dispatch-$ifindex-$prog_id
>>
>> - If someone sets the 'pinning' attribute on a map definition in a BPF
>>   file, libbpf will pin those files in /sys/fs/bpf/$map_name
>>
>> The first one leads to obvious conflicts if shared across network
>> namespaces because of ifindex collisions. The second one leads to
>> potential false sharing of state across what are supposed to be
>> independent networking domains (e.g., if the bpffs is shared, loading
>> xdp-filter inside a namespace will share the state with another instance
>> loaded in another namespace, which would no doubt be surprising).
>
> Sigh.  So non-default network namespaces can't use /sys/fs/bpf,
> because of silly userspace assumptions.  So the entries need to be
> namespaced to prevent conflicts.

Yup, basically.

>>> At that point the name conflicts either need to be fixed or we
>>> fundamentally need to have multiple mount points for bpffs.
>>> Probably under something like /run/netns-mounts/NAME/.
>>>
>>> With ip netns updated to mount the appropriate filesystem.
>>
>> I don't think it's feasible to fix the conflicts; they've been around
>> for a while and are part of application API in some cases. Plus, we
>> don't know of all BPF-using applications.
>>
>> We could have 'ip' manage separate bpffs mounts per namespace and
>> bind-mount them into each netns (I think that's what you're suggesting),
>> but that would basically achieve the same thing as the mountns
>> persisting I am proposing in this series, but only as a special case for
>> bpffs. So why not do the more flexible thing and persist the whole
>> mountns (so applications inside the namespace can actually mount
>> additional things and have them stick around)? The current behaviour
>> seems very surprising...
>
> I don't like persisting the entire mount namespace because it is hard
> for a system administrator to see, it is difficult for something outside
> of that mount namespace to access, and it is as easy to persist a
> mistake as it is to persist something deliberate.
>
> My proposal:
>
> On "ip netns add NAME"
> - create the network namespace and mount it at /run/netns/NAME
> - mount the appropriate sysfs at /run/netns-mounts/NAME/sys
> - mount the appropriate bpffs at /run/netns-mounts/NAME/sys/fs/bpf
>
> On "ip netns delete NAME"
> - umount --recursive /run/netns-mounts/NAME
> - unlink /run/netns-mounts/NAME
> - cleanup /run/netns/NAME as we do today.
>
> On "ip netns exec NAME"
> - Walk through /run/netns-mounts/NAME like we do /etc/netns/NAME/
>   and perform bind mounts.

If we setup the full /sys hierarchy in /run/netns-mounts/NAME this
basically becomes a single recursive bind mount, doesn't it?

What about if we also include bind mounts from the host namespace into
that separate /sys instance? Will those be included into a recursive
bind into /sys inside the mount-ns, or will we have to walk the tree and
do separate bind mounts for each directory?

Anyway, this scheme sounds like it'll solve the issue I was trying to
address so I don't mind doing it this way. I'll try it out and respin
the patch series.

>>> Mount propagation is a way to configure a mount namespace (before
>>> creating a new one) that will cause mounts created in the first mount
>>> namespace to be created in it's children, and cause mounts created in
>>> the children to be created in the parent (depending on how things are
>>> configured).
>>>
>>> It is not my favorite feature (it makes locking of mount namespaces
>>> terrible) and it is probably too clever by half, unfortunately systemd
>>> started enabling mount propagation by default, so we are stuck with it.
>>
>> Right. AFAICT the current iproute2 code explicitly tries to avoid that
>> when creating a mountns (it does a 'mount --make-rslave /'); so you're
>> saying we should change that?
>
> If it makes sense.
>
> I believe I added the 'mount --make-rslave /' because otherwise all
> mount activity was propagating back, and making a mess.  Especially when
> I was unmounting /sys.
>
> I am not a huge fan of mount propagation it has lots of surprising
> little details that need to be set just right, to not cause problems.

Ah, you were talking about propagation from inside the mountns to
outside? Didn't catch that at first...

> With my proposal above I think we could in some carefully chosen
> places enable mount propagation without problem.

One thing that comes to mind would be that if we create persistent /sys
instances in /run/netns-mounts per the above, it would make sense for
any modifications done inside the netns to be propagated back to the
mount in /run; is this possible with a bind mount? Not sure I quite
understand how propagation would work in this case (since it would be a
separate (bind) mount point inside the namespace).

> But I would really like to see an application that is performing
> mounts inside of "ip netns exec" to see how it matters.

Two examples come to mind:

- I believe there are some applications that will mount a private bpffs
  instance for their own use case. Not sure if those applications switch
  in and out of namespaces, though, and if they do whether they are
  namespace-aware themselves

- Interactive use ('ip netns exec $SHELL'), which I sometimes use for
  testing various things. I've mostly had issues with bpffs in this
  setting, though, so if we solve that as per the above, maybe that's
  not needed.

> Code without concrete real world test use cases tends to get things
> wrong.

Heh, amen to that :)

-Toke


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