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Message-ID: <ea02392e-4460-9695-050f-7519aecebec2@huawei.com> Date: Tue, 24 Oct 2023 06:18:54 +0300 From: "Konstantin Meskhidze (A)" <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com> To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> CC: <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>, <gnoack3000@...il.com>, <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, <netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <yusongping@...wei.com>, <artem.kuzin@...wei.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 08/12] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support 10/20/2023 12:49 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет: > On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 07:08:33AM +0300, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote: >> >> >> 10/18/2023 3:29 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет: >> > On Mon, Oct 16, 2023 at 09:50:26AM +0800, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote: >> > > This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management >> > >> > Here are some advices to better write commit messages: >> > https://docs.kernel.org/process/submitting-patches.html#describe-your-changes >> > The "Describe your changes in imperative mood" part is important for >> > this commit and others. Most of this patch series' commit messages need >> > small updates. >> >> Ok. I will refactor commit messages with "imperative mood". Thanks. >> > >> > > helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall. >> > > Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network >> > > access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock >> > > ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access >> > >> > Please explain the "why" (when it makes sense) instead of just listing >> > the "what". >> >> Ok. >> >> > >> > > rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect() >> > > LSM hooks, which enables to restrict TCP socket binding and connection >> > > to specific ports. >> > >> > I reworded and moved this part in last: >> > > For the file system, a file descriptor is a direct access to a file/data. >> > > But for the network, it's impossible to identify for which data/peer a >> > > newly created socket will give access to, it's needed to wait for a >> > > connect or bind request to identify the use case for this socket. >> > > That's why the access rights (related to ports) are tied to an opened >> > > socket, but this would not align with the way Landlock access control >> > > works for the filesystem [2]. >> >> Thanks. >> > >> > Please add empty line to split paragraphs. >> >> Got it. >> > >> > > The new landlock_net_port_attr structure has two fields. The allowed_access >> > > field contains the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_* rights. The port field contains >> > > the port value according to the allowed protocol. This field can >> > > take up to a 64-bit value [1] but the maximum value depends on the related >> > > protocol (e.g. 16-bit for TCP). >> > >> > For the file system, a file descriptor is a direct access to a file/data. >> > However, for network sockets, we cannot identify for which data or peer a newly >> > created socket will give access to. Indeed, we need to wait for a connect or >> > bind request to identify the use case for this socket. >> > >> > Access rights are not tied to socket file descriptors. Instead, bind and >> > connect actions are controlled by the task's domain. As for the filesystem, a >> > directory file descriptor may enable to open another file (i.e. a new data >> > item), but this opening is restricted by the task's domain, not the file >> > descriptor's access rights [2]. >> > >> > > >> > > [1] >> > > https://lore.kernel.org/r/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net >> > > [2] >> > > https://lore.kernel.org/all/263c1eb3-602f-57fe-8450-3f138581bee7@digikod.net >> > >> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net >> > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/263c1eb3-602f-57fe-8450-3f138581bee7@digikod.net >> Thanks. >> > >> > > >> > > Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com> >> > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230920092641.832134-9-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com >> > > [mic: Remove !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES in Kconfig, and add landlock_ prefix >> > > to add_rule_net_service()] >> > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> >> > > --- >> > > >> > > Changes since v12: >> > > * Moves add_rule_net_port() back in syscalls.c and makes it static. >> > > * Deletes bind_access_mask allowing bind action rule on port 0. >> > > * Adds comment about port 0 in landlock_net_port_attr structure. >> > > * Removes !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES from Kconfig. >> > > * Minor fixes. >> > > * Refactors commit message. >> > > >> > > Changes since v11: >> > > * Replaces dates with "2022-2023" in net.c/h files headers. >> > > * Removes WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain) in check_socket_access(). >> > > * Using "typeof(*address)" instead of offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family). >> > > * Renames LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE to LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT. >> > > * Renames landlock_net_service_attr to landlock_net_port_attr. >> > > * Defines two add_rule_net_service() functions according to >> > > IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) instead of changing the body of the only >> > > function. >> > > * Adds af_family consistency check while handling AF_UNSPEC specifically. >> > > * Adds bind_access_mask in add_rule_net_service() to deny all rules with bind >> > > action on port zero. >> > > * Minor fixes. >> > > * Refactors commit message. >> > > >> > > Changes since v10: >> > > * Removes "packed" attribute. >> > > * Applies Mickaёl's patch with some refactoring. >> > > * Deletes get_port() and check_addrlen() helpers. >> > > * Refactors check_socket_access() by squashing get_port() and >> > > check_addrlen() helpers into it. >> > > * Fixes commit message. >> > > >> > > Changes since v9: >> > > * Changes UAPI port field to __u64. >> > > * Moves shared code into check_socket_access(). >> > > * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and >> > > get_current_net_domain() helpers. >> > > * Minor fixes. >> > > >> > > Changes since v8: >> > > * Squashes commits. >> > > * Refactors commit message. >> > > * Changes UAPI port field to __be16. >> > > * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families. >> > > * Adds address length checking. >> > > * Minor fixes. >> > > >> > > Changes since v7: >> > > * Squashes commits. >> > > * Increments ABI version to 4. >> > > * Refactors commit message. >> > > * Minor fixes. >> > > >> > > Changes since v6: >> > > * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask() >> > > because it OR values. >> > > * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values. >> > > * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask(). >> > > * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use >> > > LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value. >> > > * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions. >> > > * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with >> > > landlock_key/key_type/id types. >> > > >> > > Changes since v5: >> > > * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule >> > > syscall. >> > > * Formats code with clang-format-14. >> > > >> > > Changes since v4: >> > > * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and >> > > masks checks. >> > > * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask >> > > setters/getters to support two rule types. >> > > * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath >> > > function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and >> > > landlock_put_ruleset(). >> > > >> > > Changes since v3: >> > > * Splits commit. >> > > * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions. >> > > * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network. >> > > * Adds rb_root root_net_port. >> > > >> > > --- >> > > include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 56 ++++++ >> > > security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 + >> > > security/landlock/Makefile | 2 + >> > > security/landlock/limits.h | 5 + >> > > security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++ >> > > security/landlock/net.h | 33 ++++ >> > > security/landlock/ruleset.c | 62 +++++- >> > > security/landlock/ruleset.h | 59 +++++- >> > > security/landlock/setup.c | 2 + >> > > security/landlock/syscalls.c | 69 ++++++- >> > > tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- >> > > 11 files changed, 466 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) >> > > create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c >> > > create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h >> > > >> > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h >> > > index 81d09ef9aa50..25349666b19e 100644 >> > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h >> > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h >> > > @@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr { >> > > * this access right. >> > > */ >> > > __u64 handled_access_fs; >> > > + /** >> > > + * @handled_access_net: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Network flags`_) >> > > + * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no >> > > + * rule explicitly allow them. >> > > + */ >> > > + __u64 handled_access_net; >> > > }; >> > > >> > > /* >> > > @@ -54,6 +60,11 @@ enum landlock_rule_type { >> > > * landlock_path_beneath_attr . >> > > */ >> > > LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1, >> > > + /** >> > > + * @LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT: Type of a &struct >> > > + * landlock_net_port_attr . >> > > + */ >> > > + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT = 2, >> > >> > We don't need the explicit " = 2". >> >> Fixed. Thanks. >> > >> > > }; >> > > >> > > /** >> > > @@ -79,6 +90,32 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { >> > > */ >> > > } __attribute__((packed)); >> > > >> > > +/** >> > > + * struct landlock_net_port_attr - Network port definition >> > > + * >> > > + * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule(). >> > > + */ >> > > +struct landlock_net_port_attr { >> > > + /** >> > > + * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed access network for a port >> > > + * (cf. `Network flags`_). >> > > + */ >> > > + __u64 allowed_access; >> > > + /** >> > > + * @port: Network port. Landlock does not forbid rules with port 0, >> > > + * since some network services use it. Port 0 is a reserved one in >> > > + * TCP/IP networking, meaning that it should not be used in TCP or >> > > + * UDP messages. To allocate its source port number, services call >> > > + * TCP/IP network functions like bind() to request one. With port 0 >> > > + * it triggers the operating system to automatically search for >> > > + * and return a suitable available port in the TCP/IP dynamic >> > > + * port number range. This port range can be controlled by a >> > > + * sysadmin with /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range sysctl, >> > > + * which is also used by IPv6. >> > >> > This looks too inspired from >> > https://www.lifewire.com/port-0-in-tcp-and-udp-818145 >> >> Yep. You are right. >> > >> > Let's make it simpler: >> > >> > * @port: Network port. >> > * >> > * It should be noted that port 0 passed to :manpage:`bind(2)` will >> > * bind to an available port from a specific port range. This can be >> > * configured thanks to the ``/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range`` >> > * sysctl (also used for IPv6). A Landlock rule with port 0 and the >> > * ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP`` right means that requesting to bind >> > * on port 0 is allowed and it will automatically translate to binding >> > * on the related port range. >> Thanks. >> > >> > > + */ >> > > + __u64 port; >> > > +}; >> > > + >> > > /** >> > > * DOC: fs_access >> > > * >> > > @@ -189,4 +226,23 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { >> > > #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14) >> > > /* clang-format on */ >> > > >> > > +/** >> > > + * DOC: net_access >> > > + * >> > > + * Network flags >> > > + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >> > > + * >> > > + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of network >> > > + * actions. >> > >> > You can add: >> > "This is supported since ABI 4." >> >> Updated. >> > >> > > + * >> > > + * TCP sockets with allowed actions: >> > > + * >> > > + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP: Bind a TCP socket to a local port. >> > > + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP: Connect an active TCP socket to >> > > + * a remote port. >> > > + */ >> > > +/* clang-format off */ >> > > +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0) >> > > +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1) >> > > +/* clang-format on */ >> > > #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig >> > > index c1e862a38410..c4bf0d5eff39 100644 >> > > --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig >> > > @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ >> > > config SECURITY_LANDLOCK >> > > bool "Landlock support" >> > > depends on SECURITY >> > > + select SECURITY_NETWORK >> > > select SECURITY_PATH >> > > help >> > > Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile >> > > index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644 >> > > --- a/security/landlock/Makefile >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile >> > > @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o >> > > >> > > landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ >> > > cred.o ptrace.o fs.o >> > > + >> > > +landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o >> > > \ No newline at end of file >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h >> > > index bafb3b8dc677..93c9c6f91556 100644 >> > > --- a/security/landlock/limits.h >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h >> > > @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ >> > > #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) >> > > #define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS 0 >> > > >> > > +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP >> > > +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1) >> > > +#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) >> > > +#define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS >> > > + >> > > /* clang-format on */ >> > > >> > > #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */ >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c >> > > new file mode 100644 >> > > index 000000000000..1bf26cf3c41b >> > > --- /dev/null >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/net.c >> > > @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@ >> > > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only >> > > +/* >> > > + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks >> > > + * >> > > + * Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. >> > > + * Copyright © 2022-2023 Microsoft Corporation >> > > + */ >> > > + >> > > +#include <linux/in.h> >> > > +#include <linux/net.h> >> > > +#include <linux/socket.h> >> > > +#include <net/ipv6.h> >> > > + >> > > +#include "common.h" >> > > +#include "cred.h" >> > > +#include "limits.h" >> > > +#include "net.h" >> > > +#include "ruleset.h" >> > > + >> > > +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > + const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights) >> > > +{ >> > > + int err; >> > > + const struct landlock_id id = { >> > > + .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port), >> > > + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, >> > > + }; >> > > + >> > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); >> > > + >> > > + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ >> > > + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET & >> > > + ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); >> > > + >> > > + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); >> > > + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights); >> > > + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); >> > > + >> > > + return err; >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > +static access_mask_t >> > > +get_raw_handled_net_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain) >> > > +{ >> > > + access_mask_t access_dom = 0; >> > > + size_t layer_level; >> > > + >> > > + for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++) >> > > + access_dom |= landlock_get_net_access_mask(domain, layer_level); >> > > + return access_dom; >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > +static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void) >> > > +{ >> > > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = >> > > + landlock_get_current_domain(); >> > > + >> > > + if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_net_accesses(dom)) >> > > + return NULL; >> > > + >> > > + return dom; >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *const sock, >> > >> > To be consistent with current_check_access_path(), please rename to >> > current_check_access_socket(). >> >> Done. Thanks. >> > >> > > + struct sockaddr *const address, >> > > + const int addrlen, >> > > + const access_mask_t access_request) >> > > +{ >> > > + __be16 port; >> > > + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {}; >> > > + const struct landlock_rule *rule; >> > > + access_mask_t handled_access; >> > > + struct landlock_id id = { >> > > + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, >> > > + }; >> > > + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain(); >> > >> > For consistency with other functions, s/domain/dom/g >> >> Ok. Fixed. >> > >> > > + >> > > + if (!domain) >> > > + return 0; >> > > + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) >> > > + return -EACCES; >> > > + >> > > + /* Checks if it's a (potential) TCP socket. */ >> > > + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) >> > > + return 0; >> > > + >> > > + /* Checks for minimal header length to safely read sa_family. */ >> > > + if (addrlen < offsetofend(typeof(*address), sa_family)) >> > > + return -EINVAL; >> > > + >> > > + switch (address->sa_family) { >> > > + case AF_UNSPEC: >> > > + case AF_INET: >> > > + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) >> > > + return -EINVAL; >> > > + port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port; >> > > + break; >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) >> > > + case AF_INET6: >> > > + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) >> > > + return -EINVAL; >> > > + port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port; >> > > + break; >> > > +#endif >> > >> > #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> >> #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */ I suppose. > > Indeed > >> > >> > > + default: >> > > + return 0; >> > > + } >> > > + >> > > + /* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */ >> > > + if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) { >> > > + /* >> > > + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP >> > > + * association, which have the same effect as closing the >> > > + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file >> > > + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing >> > > + * connections is always allowed. >> > > + * >> > > + * For a TCP access control system, this request is legitimate. >> > > + * Let the network stack handle potential inconsistencies and >> > > + * return -EINVAL if needed. >> > > + */ >> > > + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) >> > > + return 0; >> > > + >> > > + /* >> > > + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind >> > > + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is >> > > + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is >> > > + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of >> > > + * -EAFNOSUPPORT. >> > > + * >> > > + * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle these >> > > + * checks, but it is safer to return a proper error and test >> > > + * consistency thanks to kselftest. >> > > + */ >> > > + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) { >> > > + /* addrlen has already been checked for AF_UNSPEC. */ >> > > + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr = >> > > + (struct sockaddr_in *)address; >> > > + >> > > + if (sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family != AF_INET) >> > > + return -EINVAL; >> > > + >> > > + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY)) >> > > + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; >> > > + } >> > > + } else { >> > > + /* >> > > + * Checks sa_family consistency to not wrongfully return >> > > + * -EACCES instead of -EINVAL. Valid sa_family changes are >> > > + * only (from AF_INET or AF_INET6) to AF_UNSPEC. >> > > + * >> > > + * We could return 0 and let the network stack handle this >> > > + * check, but it is safer to return a proper error and test >> > > + * consistency thanks to kselftest. >> > > + */ >> > > + if (address->sa_family != sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family) >> > > + return -EINVAL; >> > > + } >> > > + >> > > + id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port; >> > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data)); >> > > + >> > > + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id); >> > > + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks( >> > > + domain, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); >> > > + if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, &layer_masks, >> > > + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks))) >> > > + return 0; >> > > + >> > > + return -EACCES; >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock, >> > > + struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen) >> > > +{ >> > > + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, >> > > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP); >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock, >> > > + struct sockaddr *const address, >> > > + const int addrlen) >> > > +{ >> > > + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, >> > > + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { >> > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), >> > > + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), >> > > +}; >> > > + >> > > +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) >> > > +{ >> > > + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), >> > > + LANDLOCK_NAME); >> > > +} >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h >> > > new file mode 100644 >> > > index 000000000000..588a49fd6907 >> > > --- /dev/null >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/net.h >> > > @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ >> > > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ >> > > +/* >> > > + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks >> > > + * >> > > + * Copyright © 2022-2023 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. >> > > + */ >> > > + >> > > +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H >> > > +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H >> > > + >> > > +#include "common.h" >> > > +#include "ruleset.h" >> > > +#include "setup.h" >> > > + >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> > > +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void); >> > > + >> > > +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > + const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights); >> > > +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) >> > > +{ >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > +static inline int >> > > +landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, const u16 port, >> > > + access_mask_t access_rights); >> > > +{ >> > > + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; >> > > +} >> > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > + >> > > +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */ >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c >> > > index 4c209acee01e..1fe4298ff4a7 100644 >> > > --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c >> > > @@ -36,6 +36,11 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers) >> > > refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1); >> > > mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock); >> > > new_ruleset->root_inode = RB_ROOT; >> > > + >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> > > + new_ruleset->root_net_port = RB_ROOT; >> > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > + >> > > new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers; >> > > /* >> > > * hierarchy = NULL >> > > @@ -46,16 +51,21 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers) >> > > } >> > > >> > > struct landlock_ruleset * >> > > -landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask) >> > > +landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask, >> > > + const access_mask_t net_access_mask) >> > > { >> > > struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset; >> > > >> > > /* Informs about useless ruleset. */ >> > > - if (!fs_access_mask) >> > > + if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask) >> > > return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG); >> > > new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1); >> > > - if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset)) >> > > + if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset)) >> > > + return new_ruleset; >> > > + if (fs_access_mask) >> > > landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0); >> > > + if (net_access_mask) >> > > + landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0); >> > >> > This is good, but it is not tested: we need to add a test that both >> > handle FS and net restrictions. You can add one in net.c, just handling >> > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP, add one >> > rule with path_beneath (e.g. /dev) and another with net_port, and check >> > that open("/") is denied, open("/dev") is allowed, and and only the >> > allowed port is allowed with bind(). This test should be simple and can >> > only check against an IPv4 socket, i.e. using ipv4_tcp fixture, just >> > after port_endianness. fcntl.h should then be included by net.c >> >> Ok. >> > >> > I guess that was the purpose of layout1.with_net (in fs_test.c) but it >> >> Yep. I added this kind of nest in fs_test.c to test both fs and network >> rules together. >> > is not complete. You can revamp this test and move it to net.c >> > following the above suggestions, keeping it consistent with other tests >> > in net.c . You don't need the test_open() nor create_ruleset() helpers. >> > >> > This test must failed if we change "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |=" >> > to "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] =" in >> > landlock_add_fs_access_mask() or landlock_add_net_access_mask(). >> >> Do you want to change it? Why? > > The kernel code is correct and must not be changed. However, if by > mistake we change it and remove the OR, a test should catch that. We > need a test to assert this assumption. > >> Fs and network masks are ORed to not intersect with each other. > > Yes, they are ORed, and we need a test to check that. Noting is > currently testing this OR (and the different rule type consistency). > I'm suggesting to revamp the layout1.with_net test into > ipv4_tcp.with_fs and make it check ruleset->access_masks[] and rule > addition of different types. About my previous comment. Checking the code we can notice that adding fs mask goes first: ... if (fs_access_mask) landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0); if (net_access_mask) landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0); .... So with we change "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |=" >> > to "ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] =" in landlock_add_fs_access_mask() nothing bad will happen. But if we do that in landlock_add_net_access_mask() fs mask will be overwritten and adding fs rule will fail (as unhandled allowed_accesss). > >> > >> > > return new_ruleset; >> > > } >> > > >> > > @@ -74,6 +84,11 @@ static bool is_object_pointer(const enum landlock_key_type key_type) >> > > case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE: >> > > return true; >> > > >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> > > + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT: >> > > + return false; >> > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > + >> > > default: >> > > WARN_ON_ONCE(1); >> > > return false; >> > > @@ -126,7 +141,13 @@ static struct rb_root *get_root(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE: >> > > return &ruleset->root_inode; >> > > >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> > > + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT: >> > > + return &ruleset->root_net_port; >> > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > + >> > > default: >> > > + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); >> > >> > Please move this WARN to the patch that added the previous and next >> > lines. >> >> OK. Will be moved. >> > >> > > return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); >> > > } >> > > } >> > > @@ -153,7 +174,8 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void) >> > > BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES); >> > > BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS); >> > > BUILD_BUG_ON(access_masks < >> > > - (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS)); >> > > + ((LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS) | >> > > + (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET))); >> > > } >> > > >> > > /** >> > > @@ -370,6 +392,13 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst, >> > > if (err) >> > > goto out_unlock; >> > > >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> > > + /* Merges the @src network port tree. */ >> > > + err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); >> > > + if (err) >> > > + goto out_unlock; >> > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > + >> > > out_unlock: >> > > mutex_unlock(&src->lock); >> > > mutex_unlock(&dst->lock); >> > > @@ -426,6 +455,13 @@ static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent, >> > > if (err) >> > > goto out_unlock; >> > > >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> > > + /* Copies the @parent network port tree. */ >> > > + err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); >> > > + if (err) >> > > + goto out_unlock; >> > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > + >> > > if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) { >> > > err = -EINVAL; >> > > goto out_unlock; >> > > @@ -455,6 +491,13 @@ static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset) >> > > rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root_inode, >> > > node) >> > > free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE); >> > > + >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> > > + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, >> > > + &ruleset->root_net_port, node) >> > > + free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT); >> > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > + >> > > put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy); >> > > kfree(ruleset); >> > > } >> > > @@ -635,7 +678,8 @@ get_access_mask_t(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > * >> > > * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions. >> > > * @access_request: The requested access rights to check. >> > > - * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate. >> > > + * @layer_masks: It must contain LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS or LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET >> > >> > "%LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS or %LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET" >> >> Done. >> > >> > > + * elements according to @key_type. >> > > * @key_type: The key type to switch between access masks of different types. >> > > * >> > > * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled >> > > @@ -656,6 +700,14 @@ landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, >> > > get_access_mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask; >> > > num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS; >> > > break; >> > > + >> > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> > > + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT: >> > > + get_access_mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask; >> > > + num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET; >> > > + break; >> > > +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> > > + >> > > default: >> > > WARN_ON_ONCE(1); >> > > return 0; >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h >> > > index 1ede2b9a79b7..ba4a06035599 100644 >> > > --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h >> > > @@ -33,13 +33,16 @@ >> > > typedef u16 access_mask_t; >> > > /* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */ >> > > static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS); >> > > +/* Makes sure all network access rights can be stored. */ >> > > +static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET); >> > > /* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */ >> > > static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t)); >> > > >> > > /* Ruleset access masks. */ >> > > -typedef u16 access_masks_t; >> > > +typedef u32 access_masks_t; >> > > /* Makes sure all ruleset access rights can be stored. */ >> > > -static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS); >> > > +static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >= >> > > + LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS + LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET); >> > > >> > > typedef u16 layer_mask_t; >> > > /* Makes sure all layers can be checked. */ >> > > @@ -84,6 +87,11 @@ enum landlock_key_type { >> > > * keys. >> > > */ >> > > LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE = 1, >> > > + /** >> > > + * @LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT: Type of &landlock_ruleset.root_net_port's >> > > + * node keys. >> > > + */ >> > > + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT, >> > > }; >> > > >> > > /** >> > > @@ -158,6 +166,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset { >> > > * reaches zero. >> > > */ >> > > struct rb_root root_inode; >> > >> > #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) >> OK. Done. >> > > + /** >> > > + * @root_net_port: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct >> > > + * landlock_rule nodes with network port. Once a ruleset is tied to a >> > > + * process (i.e. as a domain), this tree is immutable until @usage >> > > + * reaches zero. >> > > + */ >> > > + struct rb_root root_net_port; >> > >> > #endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ >> >> Done. >> > >> > > /** >> > > * @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent >> > > * domain vanishes. This is needed for the ptrace protection. >> > > @@ -196,13 +211,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset { >> > > */ >> > > u32 num_layers; >> > > /** >> > > - * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem >> > > - * actions that are restricted by a ruleset. A domain >> > > - * saves all layers of merged rulesets in a stack >> > > - * (FAM), starting from the first layer to the last >> > > - * one. These layers are used when merging rulesets, >> > > - * for user space backward compatibility (i.e. >> > > - * future-proof), and to properly handle merged >> > > + * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem and >> > > + * network actions that are restricted by a ruleset. >> > > + * A domain saves all layers of merged rulesets in a >> > > + * stack (FAM), starting from the first layer to the >> > > + * last one. These layers are used when merging >> > > + * rulesets, for user space backward compatibility >> > > + * (i.e. future-proof), and to properly handle merged >> > > * rulesets without overlapping access rights. These >> > > * layers are set once and never changed for the >> > > * lifetime of the ruleset. >> > > @@ -213,7 +228,8 @@ struct landlock_ruleset { >> > > }; >> > > >> > > struct landlock_ruleset * >> > > -landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask); >> > > +landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask_fs, >> > > + const access_mask_t access_mask_net); >> > > >> > > void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset); >> > > void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset); >> > > @@ -249,6 +265,19 @@ landlock_add_fs_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > (fs_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS); >> > > } >> > > >> > > +static inline void >> > > +landlock_add_net_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > + const access_mask_t net_access_mask, >> > > + const u16 layer_level) >> > > +{ >> > > + access_mask_t net_mask = net_access_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET; >> > > + >> > > + /* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */ >> > > + WARN_ON_ONCE(net_access_mask != net_mask); >> > > + ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |= >> > > + (net_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET); >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > static inline access_mask_t >> > > landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > const u16 layer_level) >> > > @@ -266,6 +295,16 @@ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > return landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, layer_level) | >> > > LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED; >> > > } >> > > + >> > > +static inline access_mask_t >> > > +landlock_get_net_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > + const u16 layer_level) >> > > +{ >> > > + return (ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] >> >> > > + LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET) & >> > > + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET; >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule, >> > > const access_mask_t access_request, >> > > layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[], >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c >> > > index 0f6113528fa4..df81612811bf 100644 >> > > --- a/security/landlock/setup.c >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c >> > > @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ >> > > #include "fs.h" >> > > #include "ptrace.h" >> > > #include "setup.h" >> > > +#include "net.h" >> > > >> > > bool landlock_initialized __ro_after_init = false; >> > > >> > > @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void) >> > > landlock_add_cred_hooks(); >> > > landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); >> > > landlock_add_fs_hooks(); >> > > + landlock_add_net_hooks(); >> > > landlock_initialized = true; >> > > pr_info("Up and running.\n"); >> > > return 0; >> > > diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c >> > > index 8a54e87dbb17..3ad652d9a146 100644 >> > > --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c >> > > +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c >> > > @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ >> > > #include "cred.h" >> > > #include "fs.h" >> > > #include "limits.h" >> > > +#include "net.h" >> > > #include "ruleset.h" >> > > #include "setup.h" >> > > >> > > @@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) >> > > { >> > > struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; >> > > struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; >> > > - size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size; >> > > + struct landlock_net_port_attr net_port_attr; >> > > + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_port_size; >> > > >> > > /* >> > > * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no >> > > @@ -82,13 +84,19 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) >> > > * struct size. >> > > */ >> > > ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs); >> > > + ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_net); >> > > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size); >> > > - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 8); >> > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 16); >> > > >> > > path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access); >> > > path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); >> > > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size); >> > > BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12); >> > > + >> > > + net_port_size = sizeof(net_port_attr.allowed_access); >> > > + net_port_size += sizeof(net_port_attr.port); >> > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_port_attr) != net_port_size); >> > > + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_port_attr) != 16); >> > > } >> > > >> > > /* Ruleset handling */ >> > > @@ -129,7 +137,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { >> > > .write = fop_dummy_write, >> > > }; >> > > >> > > -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3 >> > > +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 4 >> > > >> > > /** >> > > * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset >> > > @@ -188,8 +196,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset, >> > > LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS) >> > > return -EINVAL; >> > > >> > > + /* Checks network content (and 32-bits cast). */ >> > > + if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_net | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) != >> > > + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) >> > > + return -EINVAL; >> > > + >> > > /* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */ >> > > - ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs); >> > > + ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs, >> > > + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net); >> > > if (IS_ERR(ruleset)) >> > > return PTR_ERR(ruleset); >> > > >> > > @@ -282,7 +296,7 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > int res, err; >> > > access_mask_t mask; >> > > >> > > - /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */ >> > > + /* Copies raw user space buffer. */ >> > >> > Shouldn't this be part of a previous patch? >> >> I did it according Gunter's suggestion >> https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230627.82cde73b1efe@gnoack.org/ > > Ok, that indeed makes more sense in this patch, please keep it. > >> > >> > > res = copy_from_user(&path_beneath_attr, rule_attr, >> > > sizeof(path_beneath_attr)); >> > > if (res) >> > > @@ -315,13 +329,49 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > return err; >> > > } >> > > >> > > +static int add_rule_net_port(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset, >> > > + const void __user *const rule_attr) >> > > +{ >> > > + struct landlock_net_port_attr net_port_attr; >> > > + int res; >> > > + access_mask_t mask; >> > > + >> > > + /* Copies raw user space buffer. */ >> > > + res = copy_from_user(&net_port_attr, rule_attr, sizeof(net_port_attr)); >> > > + if (res) >> > > + return -EFAULT; >> > > + >> > > + /* >> > > + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) >> > > + * are ignored by network actions. >> > > + */ >> > > + if (!net_port_attr.allowed_access) >> > > + return -ENOMSG; >> > > + >> > > + /* >> > > + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints >> > > + * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). >> > > + */ >> > > + mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); >> > > + if ((net_port_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) >> > > + return -EINVAL; >> > > + >> > > + /* Denies inserting a rule with port higher than 65535. */ >> > >> > For consistency with the following comment: >> > "Denies inserting a rule with port greater than 65535." >> > >> Done. Thanks. >> > >> > > + if (net_port_attr.port > U16_MAX) >> > > + return -EINVAL; >> > > + >> > > + /* Imports the new rule. */ >> > > + return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_port_attr.port, >> > > + net_port_attr.allowed_access); >> > > +} >> > > + >> > > /** >> > > * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset >> > > * >> > > * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended >> > > * with the new rule. >> > > - * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only >> > > - * %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now). >> > > + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr: >> > > + * %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT. >> > > * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct >> > > * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now). >> > > * @flags: Must be 0. >> > > @@ -332,6 +382,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, >> > > * Possible returned errors are: >> > > * >> > > * - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; >> > > + * - %EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT but TCP/IP is not >> > >> > %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT >> >> Done. >> > >> > > + * supported by the running kernel; >> > > * - %EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e. >> > > * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the >> > >> > &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access or >> > &landlock_net_port_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the >> >> Fixed. Thanks. >> > >> > > * ruleset handled accesses); >> > >> > EINVAL description needs to be updated, especially for port > U16_MAX: >> > - * ruleset handled accesses); >> > + * ruleset handled accesses), or &landlock_net_port_attr.port is >> > + greater than 65535; >> >> Done. Thanks. >> > >> > >> > > @@ -366,6 +418,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd, >> > > case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH: >> > > err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr); >> > > break; >> > > + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT: >> > > + err = add_rule_net_port(ruleset, rule_attr); >> > > + break; >> > > default: >> > > err = -EINVAL; >> > > break; >> > > diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c >> > > index 792c3f0a59b4..646f778dfb1e 100644 >> > > --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c >> > > +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c >> > > @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version) >> > > const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { >> > > .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE, >> > > }; >> > > - ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, >> > > + ASSERT_EQ(4, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, >> > > LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION)); >> > > >> > > ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0, >> > > -- >> > > 2.25.1 >> > > >> > . > .
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