| lists.openwall.net | lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC | |
|
Open Source and information security mailing list archives
| ||
|
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2024 17:47:47 +0800
From: Ivanov Mikhail <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
To: <mic@...ikod.net>
CC: <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>, <gnoack3000@...il.com>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
<netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <yusongping@...wei.com>,
<artem.kuzin@...wei.com>, <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] selftests/landlock: Create 'listen_zero', 'deny_listen_zero' tests
Suggested code test scenarios where listen(2) call without explicit
bind(2) is allowed and forbidden.
Signed-off-by: Ivanov Mikhail <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 89 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
index 936cfc879f1d..6d6b5aef387f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -1714,6 +1714,95 @@ TEST_F(port_specific, bind_connect_zero)
EXPECT_EQ(0, close(bind_fd));
}
+TEST_F(port_specific, listen_zero)
+{
+ int listen_fd, connect_fd;
+ uint16_t port;
+
+ /* Adds a rule layer with bind actions. */
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ const struct landlock_net_port_attr tcp_bind_zero = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = 0,
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Checks zero port value on bind action. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0,
+ landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_PORT,
+ &tcp_bind_zero, 0));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ }
+
+ listen_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, listen_fd);
+
+ connect_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, listen_fd);
+ /*
+ * Allow listen(2) to select a random port for the socket,
+ * since bind(2) wasn't called.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, listen(listen_fd, backlog));
+
+ /* Sets binded (by listen(2)) port for both protocol families. */
+ port = get_binded_port(listen_fd, &variant->prot);
+ EXPECT_NE(0, port);
+ set_port(&self->srv0, port);
+
+ /* Connects on the binded port. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, connect_variant(connect_fd, &self->srv0));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(listen_fd));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(connect_fd));
+}
+
+TEST_F(port_specific, deny_listen_zero)
+{
+ int listen_fd, ret;
+
+ /* Adds a rule layer with bind actions. */
+ if (variant->sandbox == TCP_SANDBOX) {
+ const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd;
+
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Forbid binding to any port. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+ }
+
+ listen_fd = socket_variant(&self->srv0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, listen_fd);
+ /*
+ * Check that listen(2) call is prohibited without first calling bind(2).
+ */
+ ret = listen(listen_fd, backlog);
+ if (is_restricted(&variant->prot, variant->sandbox)) {
+ /* Denied by Landlock. */
+ EXPECT_NE(0, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(listen_fd));
+}
+
TEST_F(port_specific, bind_connect_1023)
{
int bind_fd, connect_fd, ret;
--
2.34.1
Powered by blists - more mailing lists