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Message-ID: <20240408094747.1761850-2-ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>
Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2024 17:47:46 +0800
From: Ivanov Mikhail <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
To: <mic@...ikod.net>
CC: <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>, <gnoack3000@...il.com>,
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
<netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org>, <yusongping@...wei.com>,
<artem.kuzin@...wei.com>, <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] landlock: Add hook on socket_listen()
Make hook for socket_listen(). It will check that the socket protocol is
TCP, and if the socket's local port number is 0 (which means,
that listen(2) was called without any previous bind(2) call),
then listen(2) call will be legitimate only if there is a rule for bind(2)
allowing binding to port 0 (or if LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP is not
supported by the sandbox).
Create a new check_access_socket() function to prevent useless copy paste.
It should be called by hook handlers after they perform special checks and
calculate socket port value.
Signed-off-by: Ivanov Mikhail <ivanov.mikhail1@...wei-partners.com>
Reviewed-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@...wei.com>
---
security/landlock/net.c | 104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 88 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index c8bcd29bde09..c6ae4092cfd6 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/socket.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/tcp.h>
#include "common.h"
#include "cred.h"
@@ -61,17 +62,36 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
return dom;
}
-static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
- struct sockaddr *const address,
- const int addrlen,
- access_mask_t access_request)
+static int check_access_socket(const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom,
+ __be16 port,
+ access_mask_t access_request)
{
- __be16 port;
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
const struct landlock_rule *rule;
struct landlock_id id = {
.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
};
+
+ id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
+
+ rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id);
+ access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+
+ if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, access_request, &layer_masks,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
+ struct sockaddr *const address,
+ const int addrlen,
+ access_mask_t access_request)
+{
+ __be16 port;
const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain();
if (!dom)
@@ -159,17 +179,7 @@ static int current_check_access_socket(struct socket *const sock,
return -EINVAL;
}
- id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
-
- rule = landlock_find_rule(dom, id);
- access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
- dom, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
- if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, access_request, &layer_masks,
- ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
- return 0;
-
- return -EACCES;
+ return check_access_socket(dom, port, access_request);
}
static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
@@ -187,9 +197,71 @@ static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
}
+/*
+ * Check that socket state and attributes are correct for listen.
+ * It is required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of -EINVAL.
+ */
+static int check_tcp_socket_can_listen(struct socket *const sock)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ unsigned char cur_sk_state = sk->sk_state;
+ const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk;
+
+ /* Allow only unconnected TCP socket to listen(cf. inet_listen). */
+ if (sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Check sock state consistency. */
+ if (!((1 << cur_sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Sockets can listen only if ULP control hook has clone method. */
+ icsk = inet_csk(sk);
+ if (icsk->icsk_ulp_ops && !icsk->icsk_ulp_ops->clone)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_listen(struct socket *const sock,
+ const int backlog)
+{
+ int err;
+ int family;
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_net_domain();
+
+ if (!dom)
+ return 0;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dom->num_layers < 1))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /*
+ * listen() on a TCP socket without pre-binding is allowed only
+ * if binding to port 0 is allowed.
+ */
+ family = sock->sk->__sk_common.skc_family;
+
+ if (family == AF_INET || family == AF_INET6) {
+ /* Checks if it's a (potential) TCP socket. */
+ if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Socket is alredy binded to some port. */
+ if (inet_sk(sock->sk)->inet_num != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = check_tcp_socket_can_listen(sock);
+ if (unlikely(err))
+ return err;
+
+ return check_access_socket(dom, 0, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, hook_socket_listen),
};
__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
--
2.34.1
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