netdev - Re: [PATCH] netfilter: conntrack: tcp: do not lower timeout to CLOSE for in-window RSTs

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2024 11:43:33 +0200
From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
To: yyxRoy <yyxroy22@...il.com>
Cc: pablo@...filter.org, kadlec@...filter.org, gregkh@...uxfoundation.org,
	davem@...emloft.net, edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org,
	pabeni@...hat.com, netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org,
	coreteam@...filter.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, yyxRoy <979093444@...com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] netfilter: conntrack: tcp: do not lower timeout to CLOSE
 for in-window RSTs

yyxRoy <yyxroy22@...il.com> wrote:
> With previous commit https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/be0502a
> ("netfilter: conntrack: tcp: only close if RST matches exact sequence")
> to fight against TCP in-window reset attacks, current version of netfilter
> will keep the connection state in ESTABLISHED, but lower the timeout to
> that of CLOSE (10 seconds by default) for in-window TCP RSTs, and wait for
> the peer to send a challenge ack to restore the connection timeout
> (5 mins in tests).
> 
> However, malicious attackers can prevent incurring challenge ACKs by
> manipulating the TTL value of RSTs. The attacker can probe the TTL value
> between the NAT device and itself and send in-window RST packets with
> a TTL value to be decreased to 0 after arriving at the NAT device.
> This causes the packet to be dropped rather than forwarded to the
> internal client, thus preventing a challenge ACK from being triggered.
> As the window of the sequence number is quite large (bigger than 60,000
> in tests) and the sequence number is 16-bit, the attacker only needs to
> send nearly 60,000 RST packets with different sequence numbers
> (i.e., 1, 60001, 120001, and so on) and one of them will definitely
> fall within in the window.
> 
> Therefore we can't simply lower the connection timeout to 10 seconds
> (rather short) upon receiving in-window RSTs. With this patch, netfilter
> will lower the connection timeout to that of CLOSE only when it receives
> RSTs with exact sequence numbers (i.e., old_state != new_state).

This effectively ignores most RST packets, which will clog up the
conntrack table (established timeout is 5 days).

I don't think there is anything sensible that we can do here.

Also, one can send train with data packet + rst and we will hit
the immediate close conditional:

   /* Check if rst is part of train, such as
    *   foo:80 > bar:4379: P, 235946583:235946602(19) ack 42
    *   foo:80 > bar:4379: R, 235946602:235946602(0)  ack 42
    */
    if (ct->proto.tcp.last_index == TCP_ACK_SET &&
        ct->proto.tcp.last_dir == dir &&
        seq == ct->proto.tcp.last_end)
            break;

So even if we'd make this change it doesn't prevent remote induced
resets.

Conntrack cannot validate RSTs precisely due to lack of information,
only the endpoints can do this.