Message-ID: <20240812140104.GA21559@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 16:01:04 +0200
From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
To: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
Cc: davem@...emloft.net, dsahern@...nel.org, edumazet@...gle.com,
	fw@...len.de, kuba@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org, pabeni@...hat.com,
	syzbot+8ea26396ff85d23a8929@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
	syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [net?] WARNING: refcount bug in inet_twsk_kill

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com> wrote:
> From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
> Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2024 16:00:29 -0700
> > From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
> > Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2024 18:28:50 +0200
> > > Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de> wrote:
> > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=117f3182980000
> > > > 
> > > > ... shows at two cores racing:
> > > > 
> > > > [ 3127.234402][ T1396] CPU: 3 PID: 1396 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not
> > > > and
> > > > [ 3127.257864][   T13] CPU: 1 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkalle (netns cleanup net).
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > > > first splat backtrace shows invocation of tcp_sk_exit_batch() from
> > > > netns error unwinding code.
> > > > 
> > > > Second one lacks backtrace, but its also in tcp_sk_exit_batch(),
> > > 
> > > ... which doesn't work.  Does this look like a plausible
> > > theory/exlanation?
> > 
> > Yes!  The problem here is that inet_twsk_purge() operates on twsk
> > not in net_exit_list, but I think such a check is overkill and we
> > can work around it in another way.

I'm not so sure.  Once 'other' inet_twsk_purge() found the twsk and
called inet_twsk_kill(), 'our' task has to wait for that to complete.

We need to force proper ordering so that all twsk found

static void __net_exit tcp_sk_exit_batch(struct list_head *net_exit_list)
{
        struct net *net;

/*HERE*/tcp_twsk_purge(net_exit_list);

        list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list) {
                inet_pernet_hashinfo_free(net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.hashinfo);

.... have gone through inet_twsk_kill() so tw_refcount managed to
drop back to 1 before doing
                WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount));
.

> > We need to sync two inet_twsk_kill(), so maybe give up one
> > if twsk is not hashed ?

Not sure, afaiu only one thread enters inet_twsk_kill()
(the one that manages to deactivate the timer).

> > ---8<---
> > diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
> > index 337390ba85b4..51889567274b 100644
> > --- a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
> > +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
> > @@ -52,7 +52,10 @@ static void inet_twsk_kill(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
> >  	struct inet_bind_hashbucket *bhead, *bhead2;
> >  
> >  	spin_lock(lock);
> > -	sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu((struct sock *)tw);
> > +	if (!sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu((struct sock *)tw)) {
> > +		spin_unlock(lock);
> > +		return false;
> 
> forgot to remove false, just return :)

I don't see how this helps, we need to wait until 'stolen' twsk
has gone through inet_twsk_kill() and decremented tw_refcount.
Obviously It would be a bit simpler if we had a reliable reproducer :-)

Possible solutions I came up with so far:

1) revert b099ce2602d8 ("net: Batch inet_twsk_purge").

This commit replaced a net_eq(twsk_net(tw) ... with a check for
dead netns (ns.count == 0),

Downside: We need to remove the purged_once trick that calls
inet_twsk_purge(&tcp_hashinfo) only once per exiting batch in
tcp_twsk_purge() as well.

As per b099ce2602d8 changelog, likely increases netns dismantle times.

Upside: simpler code, so this is my preferred solution.

No concurrent runoff anymore, by time tcp_twsk_purge() returns it has
called refcount_dec(->tw_refcount) for every twsk in the exiting netns
list, without other task stealing twsks owned by exiting netns.

Solution 2: change tcp_sk_exit_batch like this:

   tcp_twsk_purge(net_exit_list);

+  list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list) {
+      while (refcount_read(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount) > 1)
+         schedule();
+
+  }

    list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list) {
       inet_pernet_hashinfo_free(net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.hashinfo);
       WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount));

This synchronizes two concurrent tcp_sk_exit_batch() calls via
existing refcount; if netns setup error unwinding ran off with one of
'our' twsk, it will wait until other task has completed the refcount decrement.

I don't expect it to increase netns dismantle times, else we'd have seen
the WARN_ON_ONCE splat frequently.

Solution 3:

Similar to 2), but via mutex_lock/unlock pair:

static void __net_exit tcp_sk_exit_batch(struct list_head *net_exit_list)
{
        struct net *net;

	mutex_lock(&tcp_exit_batch_mutex);

        tcp_twsk_purge(net_exit_list);

        list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list) {
                inet_pernet_hashinfo_free(net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.hashinfo);
                WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount));
                tcp_fastopen_ctx_destroy(net);
        }
	mutex_unlock(&tcp_exit_batch_mutex);
}

Solution 4:

I have doubts wrt. tcp_twsk_purge() interaction with tw timer firing at
the 'wrong' time.  This is independent "problem", I might be
imagining things here.

Consider:
313 void inet_twsk_purge(struct inet_hashinfo *hashinfo)
314 {
[..]
321         for (slot = 0; slot <= ehash_mask; slot++, head++) {

tw sk timer fires on other cpu, inet_twsk_kill() does:

56         spin_lock(lock);
57         sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu((struct sock *)tw);
58         spin_unlock(lock);

... then other cpu gets preempted.
inet_twsk_purge() resumes and hits empty chain head:

322                 if (hlist_nulls_empty(&head->chain))
323                         continue;

so we don't(can't) wait for the timer to run to completion.

If this sounds plausible to you, this gives us solution 4:

Restart inet_twsk_purge() loop until tw_dr->tw_refcount) has
dropped down to 1.

Alternatively (still assuming the above race is real), sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu
needs to be moved down:

 48 static void inet_twsk_kill(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
...
 58     /* Disassociate with bind bucket. */
...
 68     spin_unlock(&bhead->lock);

 70     refcount_dec(&tw->tw_dr->tw_refcount);

 +      spin_lock(lock);
 +      sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu((struct sock *)tw);
 +      spin_unlock(lock);
71      inet_twsk_put(tw);
72 }

... so concurrent purge() call will find us
the node list (and then wait on timer_shutdown_sync())
until other cpu executing the timer is done.

If twsk was unlinked from table already before
inet_twsk_purge() had chance to find it sk, then in worst
case call to tcp_twsk_destructor() is missing, but I don't
see any ordering requirements that need us to wait for this.

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