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Message-ID: <CAL+tcoCyq4Xra97sEhxGQBB8PVtKa5qGj0wW7wM=a9tu-fOumw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2024 22:30:26 +0800
From: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>
To: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>, davem@...emloft.net, dsahern@...nel.org,
edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
netdev@...r.kernel.org, pabeni@...hat.com,
syzbot+8ea26396ff85d23a8929@...kaller.appspotmail.com,
syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [syzbot] [net?] WARNING: refcount bug in inet_twsk_kill
Hello Florian,
On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 10:02 PM Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de> wrote:
>
> Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com> wrote:
> > From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@...zon.com>
> > Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2024 16:00:29 -0700
> > > From: Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de>
> > > Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2024 18:28:50 +0200
> > > > Florian Westphal <fw@...len.de> wrote:
> > > > > https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=117f3182980000
> > > > >
> > > > > ... shows at two cores racing:
> > > > >
> > > > > [ 3127.234402][ T1396] CPU: 3 PID: 1396 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not
> > > > > and
> > > > > [ 3127.257864][ T13] CPU: 1 PID: 13 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Not tainted 6.9.0-syzkalle (netns cleanup net).
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > first splat backtrace shows invocation of tcp_sk_exit_batch() from
> > > > > netns error unwinding code.
> > > > >
> > > > > Second one lacks backtrace, but its also in tcp_sk_exit_batch(),
> > > >
> > > > ... which doesn't work. Does this look like a plausible
> > > > theory/exlanation?
> > >
> > > Yes! The problem here is that inet_twsk_purge() operates on twsk
> > > not in net_exit_list, but I think such a check is overkill and we
> > > can work around it in another way.
>
> I'm not so sure. Once 'other' inet_twsk_purge() found the twsk and
> called inet_twsk_kill(), 'our' task has to wait for that to complete.
>
> We need to force proper ordering so that all twsk found
>
> static void __net_exit tcp_sk_exit_batch(struct list_head *net_exit_list)
> {
> struct net *net;
>
> /*HERE*/tcp_twsk_purge(net_exit_list);
>
> list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list) {
> inet_pernet_hashinfo_free(net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.hashinfo);
>
> .... have gone through inet_twsk_kill() so tw_refcount managed to
> drop back to 1 before doing
> WARN_ON_ONCE(!refcount_dec_and_test(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount));
> .
>
> > > We need to sync two inet_twsk_kill(), so maybe give up one
> > > if twsk is not hashed ?
>
> Not sure, afaiu only one thread enters inet_twsk_kill()
> (the one that manages to deactivate the timer).
>
> > > ---8<---
> > > diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
> > > index 337390ba85b4..51889567274b 100644
> > > --- a/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
> > > +++ b/net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c
> > > @@ -52,7 +52,10 @@ static void inet_twsk_kill(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
> > > struct inet_bind_hashbucket *bhead, *bhead2;
> > >
> > > spin_lock(lock);
> > > - sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu((struct sock *)tw);
> > > + if (!sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu((struct sock *)tw)) {
> > > + spin_unlock(lock);
> > > + return false;
> >
> > forgot to remove false, just return :)
>
> I don't see how this helps, we need to wait until 'stolen' twsk
> has gone through inet_twsk_kill() and decremented tw_refcount.
> Obviously It would be a bit simpler if we had a reliable reproducer :-)
Allow me to say something irrelevant to this bug report.
Do you think that Kuniyuki's patch can solve the race between two
'killers' calling inet_twsk_deschedule_put()->inet_twsk_kill()
concurrently at two cores, say, inet_twsk_purge() and tcp_abort()?
It at least does help avoid decrementing tw_refcount twice in the
above case if I understand correctly.
Thanks,
Jason
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