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Message-ID: <49ad2b87-29af-429e-8acb-2bba13e2b2aa@linux.dev>
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2024 17:19:36 -0800
From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
To: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>, willemb@...gle.com,
 davem@...emloft.net, edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org,
 pabeni@...hat.com, dsahern@...nel.org, ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net,
 andrii@...nel.org, eddyz87@...il.com, song@...nel.org,
 yonghong.song@...ux.dev, john.fastabend@...il.com, kpsingh@...nel.org,
 sdf@...ichev.me, haoluo@...gle.com, jolsa@...nel.org, shuah@...nel.org,
 ykolal@...com, bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org,
 Jason Xing <kernelxing@...cent.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 02/14] net-timestamp: allow two features to
 work parallelly

On 11/5/24 6:51 PM, Jason Xing wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 6, 2024 at 9:09 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
>>
>> On 11/5/24 4:17 PM, Jason Xing wrote:
>>> On Wed, Nov 6, 2024 at 3:22 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 11/4/24 10:22 PM, Jason Xing wrote:
>>>>> On Tue, Nov 5, 2024 at 10:09 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/1/24 6:32 AM, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
>>>>>>>> In udp/raw/..., I don't know how likely is the user space having "cork->tx_flags
>>>>>>>> & SKBTX_ANY_TSTAMP" set but has neither "READ_ONCE(sk->sk_tsflags) &
>>>>>>>> SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID" nor "cork->flags & IPCORK_TS_OPT_ID" set.
>>>>>>> This is not something to rely on. OPT_ID was added relatively recently.
>>>>>>> Older applications, or any that just use the most straightforward API,
>>>>>>> will not set this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Good point that the OPT_ID per cmsg is very new.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The datagram support on SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID in sk->sk_tsflags had
>>>>>> been there for quite some time now. Is it a safe assumption that
>>>>>> most applications doing udp tx timestamping should have
>>>>>> the SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID set to be useful?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If it is
>>>>>>>> unlikely, may be we can just disallow bpf prog from directly setting
>>>>>>>> skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey for this particular skb.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For all other cases, in __ip[6]_append_data, directly call a bpf prog and also
>>>>>>>> pass the kernel decided tskey to the bpf prog.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The kernel passed tskey could be 0 (meaning the user space has not used it). The
>>>>>>>> bpf prog can give one for the kernel to use. The bpf prog can store the
>>>>>>>> sk_tskey_bpf in the bpf_sk_storage now. Meaning no need to add one to the struct
>>>>>>>> sock. The bpf prog does not have to start from 0 (e.g. start from U32_MAX
>>>>>>>> instead) if it helps.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If the kernel passed tskey is not 0, the bpf prog can just use that one
>>>>>>>> (assuming the user space is doing something sane, like the value in
>>>>>>>> SCM_TS_OPT_ID won't be jumping back and front between 0 to U32_MAX). I hope this
>>>>>>>> is very unlikely also (?) but the bpf prog can probably detect this and choose
>>>>>>>> to ignore this sk.
>>>>>>> If an applications uses OPT_ID, it is unlikely that they will toggle
>>>>>>> the feature on and off on a per-packet basis. So in the common case
>>>>>>> the program could use the user-set counter or use its own if userspace
>>>>>>> does not enable the feature. In the rare case that an application does
>>>>>>> intermittently set an OPT_ID, the numbering would be erratic. This
>>>>>>> does mean that an actively malicious application could mess with admin
>>>>>>> measurements.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> All make sense. Given it is reasonable to assume the user space should either
>>>>>> has SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID always on or always off. When it is off, the bpf
>>>>>> prog can directly provide its own tskey to be used in shinfo->tskey. The bpf
>>>>>> prog can generate the id itself without using the sk->sk_tskey, e.g. store an
>>>>>> atomic int in the bpf_sk_storage.
>>>>>
>>>>> I wonder, how can we correlate the key with each skb in the bpf
>>>>> program for non-TCP type without implementing a bpf extension for
>>>>> SCM_TS_OPT_ID? Every time the timestamp is reported, we cannot know
>>>>> which sendmsg() the skb belongs to for non-TCP cases.
>>>>
>>>> SCM_TS_OPT_ID is eventually setting the shinfo->tskey.
>>>> If the shinfo->tskey is not set by the user space, the bpf prog can directly set
>>>> the shinfo->tskey. There is no need to use the sk->sk_tskey as the ID generator
>>>> also. The bpf prog can have its own id generator.
>>>>
>>>> If the user space has already set the shinfo->tskey (either by sk->sk_tskey or
>>>> SCM_TS_OPT_ID), the bpf prog can just use the user space one.
>>>>
>>>> If there is a weird application that flips flops between OPT_ID on/off, the bpf
>>>> prog will get confused which is fine. The bpf prog can detect this and choose to
>>>> ignore measuring this sk/skb. The bpf prog can also choose to be on the very
>>>> safe side and ignore all skb with SKBTX_ANY_TSTAMP set in txflags but with no
>>>> OPT_ID. The bpf prog can look into the details of the sk and skb to decide what
>>>> makes the most sense for its deployment.
>>>>
>>>> I don't know whether it makes more sense to call the bpf prog to decide the
>>>> shinfo->{tx_flags,tskey} just before the "while (length > 0)" in
>>>> __ip[6]_append_data or it is better to call the bpf prog in ip[6]_setup_cork.
>>>> I admittedly less familiar with this code path than the tcp one.
>>>
>>> Now I feel it could be complicated for a software engineer to consider
>>> how they will handle the key if they don't read the kernel code very
>>> carefully. They are facing different situations. Being user-friendly
>>> lets this feature have more chances to get widely used. As I insisted
>>> before, I still would like to know if it is possible that we can try
>>> to introduce sk_tskey_bpf_offset (like patch 10-12) to calculate a bpf
>>> exclusive tskey for bpf use? Only exporting one key. It will be really
>>> simple and easy-to-use :)
>>
>> imo, there is no need for adding sk_tskey_bpf_offset to sk. just allow the bpf
>> prog to decide what is the tskey.
>>
>> There is no usability issue in bpf prog. It is pretty normal for a bpf prog
>> author to look at the sk details to make decision.
>>
>> Abstracting the sk/skb is not helping the bpf prog and not the right direction
>> to go. Over time, there has been case over case that the bpf prog wants to know
>> more instead of being abstracted away like running in the user space. e.g. The
>> "struct bpf_sock" abstraction in the uapi/linux/bpf.h does not scale and we have
>> stopped adding more abstraction this way. The btf (and PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
>> CO-RE...etc) has been added to allow the bpf prog to learn other details in sk
>> and skb.
>>
>> Instead, design a better bpf kfunc to help the bpf prog to set the bits/tskey in
>> the skb. I think this is more important. tcp tskey is easy. just need some care
>> on the udp tskey and need to check if the user space has already set one.
>> A good designed bpf kfunc is all it needs.
> 
> Thanks!
> 
> Let me confirm again in case I'm missing something important.
> 1) For tcp, as you said before, bpf prog can extract the seq from the
> exported skb, so I don't need to export any key in this case.
> 2) For udp, if the skb has skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey set, then export the
> key, else, export zero to the bpf program.

A follow up to myself on the earlier bpf kfunc comment. Something like this:

/* ack: request ACK timestamp (tcp only)
  * req_tskey: bpf prog can request to use a particular tskey.
  *            req_tskey should always be 0 for tcp.
  * return: -ve for error. u32 for the tskey that the bpf prog should use.
  *	   may be different from the req_tskey (e.g. the user space has
  *         already set one).
  */
__bpf_kfunc s64 bpf_skops_enable_tx_tstamp(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *skops,
					   bool ack, u32 req_tskey);

/* "not sure" if this kfunc is needed. probably no. I think it is easier to pass
  * true/false in the args[0]. It seems tskey can be 0 in udp, so
  * passing tskey can't tell if the skb/cork/sockcm_cookie has the tskey.
  */
__bpf_kfunc bool bpf_skops_has_tskey(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *skops);

For udp, I don't know whether it will be easier to set the tskey in the 'cork' 
or 'sockcm_cookie' or 'skb'. I guess it depends where the bpf prog is called. If 
skb, it seems the bpf prog may be called repetitively for doing the same thing 
in the while loop in __ip[6]_append_data. If it is better to set the 'cork' or 
'sockcm_cookie', the cork/sockcm_cookie pointer can be added to 'struct 
bpf_sock_ops_kern'. The sizeof(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern) is at 64bytes. Adding 
one pointer is not ideal.... probably it can be union with syn_skb but will need 
some code audit (so please check).


> 3) extend SCM_TS_OPT_ID for the udp/bpf case.

I don't understand. What does it mean to extend SCM_TS_OPT_ID?

> I'm not sure if I should postpone implementing this part after the
> basic framework of this series gets merged. Anyway, I will try this :)

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