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Message-ID: <CAL+tcoAmajwBTkfrWez8sEsyHJUga5qbiOdpybjPPe44dyfYxw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 11:31:51 +0800
From: Jason Xing <kerneljasonxing@...il.com>
To: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@...il.com>, willemb@...gle.com, 
	davem@...emloft.net, edumazet@...gle.com, kuba@...nel.org, pabeni@...hat.com, 
	dsahern@...nel.org, ast@...nel.org, daniel@...earbox.net, andrii@...nel.org, 
	eddyz87@...il.com, song@...nel.org, yonghong.song@...ux.dev, 
	john.fastabend@...il.com, kpsingh@...nel.org, sdf@...ichev.me, 
	haoluo@...gle.com, jolsa@...nel.org, shuah@...nel.org, ykolal@...com, 
	bpf@...r.kernel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, 
	Jason Xing <kernelxing@...cent.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 02/14] net-timestamp: allow two features to
 work parallelly

On Thu, Nov 7, 2024 at 9:19 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
>
> On 11/5/24 6:51 PM, Jason Xing wrote:
> > On Wed, Nov 6, 2024 at 9:09 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 11/5/24 4:17 PM, Jason Xing wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Nov 6, 2024 at 3:22 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> On 11/4/24 10:22 PM, Jason Xing wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 5, 2024 at 10:09 AM Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev> wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> On 11/1/24 6:32 AM, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
> >>>>>>>> In udp/raw/..., I don't know how likely is the user space having "cork->tx_flags
> >>>>>>>> & SKBTX_ANY_TSTAMP" set but has neither "READ_ONCE(sk->sk_tsflags) &
> >>>>>>>> SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID" nor "cork->flags & IPCORK_TS_OPT_ID" set.
> >>>>>>> This is not something to rely on. OPT_ID was added relatively recently.
> >>>>>>> Older applications, or any that just use the most straightforward API,
> >>>>>>> will not set this.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Good point that the OPT_ID per cmsg is very new.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> The datagram support on SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID in sk->sk_tsflags had
> >>>>>> been there for quite some time now. Is it a safe assumption that
> >>>>>> most applications doing udp tx timestamping should have
> >>>>>> the SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID set to be useful?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> If it is
> >>>>>>>> unlikely, may be we can just disallow bpf prog from directly setting
> >>>>>>>> skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey for this particular skb.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> For all other cases, in __ip[6]_append_data, directly call a bpf prog and also
> >>>>>>>> pass the kernel decided tskey to the bpf prog.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> The kernel passed tskey could be 0 (meaning the user space has not used it). The
> >>>>>>>> bpf prog can give one for the kernel to use. The bpf prog can store the
> >>>>>>>> sk_tskey_bpf in the bpf_sk_storage now. Meaning no need to add one to the struct
> >>>>>>>> sock. The bpf prog does not have to start from 0 (e.g. start from U32_MAX
> >>>>>>>> instead) if it helps.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> If the kernel passed tskey is not 0, the bpf prog can just use that one
> >>>>>>>> (assuming the user space is doing something sane, like the value in
> >>>>>>>> SCM_TS_OPT_ID won't be jumping back and front between 0 to U32_MAX). I hope this
> >>>>>>>> is very unlikely also (?) but the bpf prog can probably detect this and choose
> >>>>>>>> to ignore this sk.
> >>>>>>> If an applications uses OPT_ID, it is unlikely that they will toggle
> >>>>>>> the feature on and off on a per-packet basis. So in the common case
> >>>>>>> the program could use the user-set counter or use its own if userspace
> >>>>>>> does not enable the feature. In the rare case that an application does
> >>>>>>> intermittently set an OPT_ID, the numbering would be erratic. This
> >>>>>>> does mean that an actively malicious application could mess with admin
> >>>>>>> measurements.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> All make sense. Given it is reasonable to assume the user space should either
> >>>>>> has SOF_TIMESTAMPING_OPT_ID always on or always off. When it is off, the bpf
> >>>>>> prog can directly provide its own tskey to be used in shinfo->tskey. The bpf
> >>>>>> prog can generate the id itself without using the sk->sk_tskey, e.g. store an
> >>>>>> atomic int in the bpf_sk_storage.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I wonder, how can we correlate the key with each skb in the bpf
> >>>>> program for non-TCP type without implementing a bpf extension for
> >>>>> SCM_TS_OPT_ID? Every time the timestamp is reported, we cannot know
> >>>>> which sendmsg() the skb belongs to for non-TCP cases.
> >>>>
> >>>> SCM_TS_OPT_ID is eventually setting the shinfo->tskey.
> >>>> If the shinfo->tskey is not set by the user space, the bpf prog can directly set
> >>>> the shinfo->tskey. There is no need to use the sk->sk_tskey as the ID generator
> >>>> also. The bpf prog can have its own id generator.
> >>>>
> >>>> If the user space has already set the shinfo->tskey (either by sk->sk_tskey or
> >>>> SCM_TS_OPT_ID), the bpf prog can just use the user space one.
> >>>>
> >>>> If there is a weird application that flips flops between OPT_ID on/off, the bpf
> >>>> prog will get confused which is fine. The bpf prog can detect this and choose to
> >>>> ignore measuring this sk/skb. The bpf prog can also choose to be on the very
> >>>> safe side and ignore all skb with SKBTX_ANY_TSTAMP set in txflags but with no
> >>>> OPT_ID. The bpf prog can look into the details of the sk and skb to decide what
> >>>> makes the most sense for its deployment.
> >>>>
> >>>> I don't know whether it makes more sense to call the bpf prog to decide the
> >>>> shinfo->{tx_flags,tskey} just before the "while (length > 0)" in
> >>>> __ip[6]_append_data or it is better to call the bpf prog in ip[6]_setup_cork.
> >>>> I admittedly less familiar with this code path than the tcp one.
> >>>
> >>> Now I feel it could be complicated for a software engineer to consider
> >>> how they will handle the key if they don't read the kernel code very
> >>> carefully. They are facing different situations. Being user-friendly
> >>> lets this feature have more chances to get widely used. As I insisted
> >>> before, I still would like to know if it is possible that we can try
> >>> to introduce sk_tskey_bpf_offset (like patch 10-12) to calculate a bpf
> >>> exclusive tskey for bpf use? Only exporting one key. It will be really
> >>> simple and easy-to-use :)
> >>
> >> imo, there is no need for adding sk_tskey_bpf_offset to sk. just allow the bpf
> >> prog to decide what is the tskey.
> >>
> >> There is no usability issue in bpf prog. It is pretty normal for a bpf prog
> >> author to look at the sk details to make decision.
> >>
> >> Abstracting the sk/skb is not helping the bpf prog and not the right direction
> >> to go. Over time, there has been case over case that the bpf prog wants to know
> >> more instead of being abstracted away like running in the user space. e.g. The
> >> "struct bpf_sock" abstraction in the uapi/linux/bpf.h does not scale and we have
> >> stopped adding more abstraction this way. The btf (and PTR_TO_BTF_ID,
> >> CO-RE...etc) has been added to allow the bpf prog to learn other details in sk
> >> and skb.
> >>
> >> Instead, design a better bpf kfunc to help the bpf prog to set the bits/tskey in
> >> the skb. I think this is more important. tcp tskey is easy. just need some care
> >> on the udp tskey and need to check if the user space has already set one.
> >> A good designed bpf kfunc is all it needs.
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> > Let me confirm again in case I'm missing something important.
> > 1) For tcp, as you said before, bpf prog can extract the seq from the
> > exported skb, so I don't need to export any key in this case.
> > 2) For udp, if the skb has skb_shinfo(skb)->tskey set, then export the
> > key, else, export zero to the bpf program.
>
> A follow up to myself on the earlier bpf kfunc comment. Something like this:

Thank you so much!

>
> /* ack: request ACK timestamp (tcp only)
>   * req_tskey: bpf prog can request to use a particular tskey.
>   *            req_tskey should always be 0 for tcp.
>   * return: -ve for error. u32 for the tskey that the bpf prog should use.
>   *        may be different from the req_tskey (e.g. the user space has
>   *         already set one).
>   */
> __bpf_kfunc s64 bpf_skops_enable_tx_tstamp(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *skops,
>                                            bool ack, u32 req_tskey);
>
> /* "not sure" if this kfunc is needed. probably no. I think it is easier to pass
>   * true/false in the args[0]. It seems tskey can be 0 in udp, so

Good idea.

>   * passing tskey can't tell if the skb/cork/sockcm_cookie has the tskey.
>   */
> __bpf_kfunc bool bpf_skops_has_tskey(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern *skops);
>
> For udp, I don't know whether it will be easier to set the tskey in the 'cork'
> or 'sockcm_cookie' or 'skb'. I guess it depends where the bpf prog is called. If
> skb, it seems the bpf prog may be called repetitively for doing the same thing
> in the while loop in __ip[6]_append_data. If it is better to set the 'cork' or
> 'sockcm_cookie', the cork/sockcm_cookie pointer can be added to 'struct
> bpf_sock_ops_kern'. The sizeof(struct bpf_sock_ops_kern) is at 64bytes. Adding
> one pointer is not ideal.... probably it can be union with syn_skb but will need
> some code audit (so please check).

Let me dig into it :)

>
>
> > 3) extend SCM_TS_OPT_ID for the udp/bpf case.
>
> I don't understand. What does it mean to extend SCM_TS_OPT_ID?

Oh, I thought you expect to pass the key from the bpf program through
using the interface of SCM_TS_OPT_ID feature which isn't supported by
bpf. Let me think more about it first.

Thanks,
Jason

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